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I. INTRODUCTION

While riparian doctrine began as a common law creation in the
eastern thirty-one states,' seventeen of those states have already adopted
water use regulation statutes that create forms of regulated riparianism.2
The conditions that gave rise to these statutes have expanded and new
factors have come to the fore, making it imperative that every eastern state
review its current law, common or statutory, to make sure it has in place
the best legal structure for dealing with change. These old and new
conditions include continued population growth, continued environmental

and ecological degradation, global warming, and conversion from
individual withdrawals of water to more and more multiple, larger
acquisition and delivery systems. The result is increasing demand with no
significant new supply becoming available.
Robert H. Abrams in a 1989 article3 presented a thorough and
sound review of supply and demand for water in the eastern United
States,4 concluding that a change in common law riparianism was needed
to deal with the perceived imbalance in supply and demand.' There is no
"Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois.
'Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water Under 'Pure'Riparian Rights, in 1
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.01 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).
2 Joseph W. Dellapenna, Regulated Ripariansim, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 413579 (R. Beck ed. 1991 & Supp. 1999). See id. at 445-46. Dellapenna coined the phrase
"regulated riparianism" to describe these statutory systems. See Joseph W. Dellapenna,
Owning Surface Water in the Eastern United States, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH ANN.
INST. E. MIN. L. FOUND. § 1.03[3] (1985). See also Abrams, infra note 3, at 1381 n. 4.
' Robert H. Abrams, Charting the Course of Riparianism: An Instrumentalist Theory of
Change, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1381 (1989).
4 Id. at 1405-1445.
5 Id. at 1445-46. Abram's recommendations for change were presented in two
subsequent articles: Robert H. Abrams, Water Allocation by Comprehensive Permit
Systems in the East: Consideringa Move Away from Orthodoxy, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 255
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need to do that analysis again. All that is necessary is to state the above
conclusion and to point out that in the intervening years since Abrams'
article, new data and commentary has simply reinforced and solidified
Abrams' conclusions. For example, a part of Abrams' analysis is based on
7
the evidence of global warming,6 now at a point of even greater certainty
than when Abrams wrote. While the world has taken notice of global
warming' and there has been some movement toward an effort to at least
slow the process of global warming,9 these efforts overall do not appear
very significant."
One positive development on the supply front, however, is the
continuing push for advancement in desalination technology. At a recent
public symposium" led by former United States Senator Paul Simon, 2
experts from around the world 3 gathered to consider the global need for
(1990), and Robert H. Abrams, Replacing Riparianism in the Twenty-First Century, 36
WAYNE L. REV. 93 (1989).
6 Abrams, supra note 3, at 1409-1418.
7 See Peter H. Gleick, Climate Change and Water Resources: What
Does the Future
Hold?, in THE WORLD'S WATER 1998-1999: THE BIENNIAL REPORT ON FRESHWATER

RESOURCES 137-153 (1998).
s UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, May 19, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849; The Kyoto Protocol
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 3rd Sess., Agenda

Item 5, UN Doc. FCCC/cp/1997/L7/Add. 1 (1997); Global Warming Fearson the Rise, S.
ILLINOISAN, Nov. 3, 1999, at 4C, (U.N. Climate Conference in Bonn, Germany, Nov. 2,
1999); "Our new data and understanding now point to the critical situation we face: To
slow future change, we must start taking action soon." D. James Baker, Administrator,
U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, & Peter D. Ewins, CEO, United
Kingdom Meteorological Office, Letter, Basic Science of Global Warming Has not
Changed, USA TODAY, Jan. 6, 2000, at 14A.
9 See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, MEETING THE CLIMATE CHANGE CHALLENGE: REDUCING
GREENHOUSE GASES BY MORE EFFICIENT USE OF FOSSIL FUELS (1994); AMERICA'S
CLIMATE CHANGE STRATEGY: AN ACTION AGENDA (1990).
See Gleick, supra note 7; Baker, supra note 8.
"THE ROLE OF DESALINATION IN AVERTING A GLOBAL WATER CRISIS (Held September
19-20, 1999, Southern Illinois University Carbondale).
"2PAUL SIMON, TAPPED OUT: THE COMING WORLD CRISIS IN WATER AND WHAT WE
CAN DO ABOUT IT (1998).
"3The Symposium included representatives from West Neck Strategies; The Population
Institute; The Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment and Security;
Southwest Florida Water Management District; Stone and Webster Engineering
Corporation; International Desalination and Water Reuse Quarterly; The World Bank;
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation; International Water Resources Association; Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency; AEPI/RosTek, Inc.; and American States Water
Company. See GLOBAL WATER CRISIS RECOMMENDATIONS c. p. 6 (unpaginated 1999).
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water. Their consensus report to the public called not only for substantial
further developments in desalination, 4 which at least creates potable
water, but also for (1) a U.N. resolution asking countries to devote 5
percent of their current weapons research budgets to water supply and
sanitation needs; (2) encouraging international mechanisms for resolving
water access disputes; and (3) intensifying efforts to stabilize global
population growth. 5 The relevance of desalination technology to coastal
states is obvious; 6 the relevance for users far inland is much less clear.
However, because the cost is so high, desalination's potential in the
current market is limited. 7 It is also possible that weather modification
could lead to augmented supplies." However, considerable uncertainty
exists about the precipitation that could be gained, although some studies
suggest a 12 to 17 percent increase, 9 this effort is also expensive.2" Thus
it is unlikely that even desalination and weather modification taken
together would solve current and projected water problems.
Although the rising demand and environmental needs noted above
face the entire country, my focus in this paper is on the riparian
approaches extant in the thirty-one eastern states of the United States. My
general hypothesis is that The Regulated Riparian Model Water Code
(hereinafter in text as Code)2' offers a model for the twenty-first century
that will allow these needs to be addressed not only by the states that have
no pertinent statutes, but also by states with inadequate statutes.
141d.
'Id. at c. p. 3.
16 See Clifford Nielson, Desalination Becoming a Major Industry, U.S. WATER NEWS,
July 1999, at 13, col. 1 (Tampa proposed 2.5 million gallon per day plant scheduled to
begin operation in 2002).
" Peter H. Gleick, The Changing Water Paradigm,in THE WORLD'S WATER 1998-1999:
THE BIENNIAL REPORT ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES 29-32 (1998). The Tampa plant, see
Nielson, supra note 16, would cost $2 per 1000 gallons, apparently twice the cost of well
water.
, Robert E. Beck, Augmenting the Available Water Supply, in 1 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 3.04 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).
'9 Robert E. Beck, Augmenting the Available Water Supply, in 1 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 3.04(a) text accompanyingn. 48 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).
20

See Robert E. Beck, Augmenting the Available Water Supply, in I WATERS AND
§ 3.04(c) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).

WATER RIGHTS
21

THE REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE: FINAL REPORT OF THE WATER LAWS
COMMITTEE OF THE WATER RESOURCES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT DIVISION OF THE

AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS (Joseph W.

referred to in citations as RRMWC].

Dellapenna ed., 1997) [hereinafter
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The Code22 was published in 1997 under the auspices of the
American Society of Civil Engineers.23 It is the first of two24 end products
of a seven-year effort by the Society's Water Laws Committee, which
began under the chairmanship of Professor Ray Jay Davis25 and concluded
under the chairmanship of Professor Joseph W. Dellapenna.26 Professor
Dellapenna also served as Editor of the Code. The Code is well crafted in
its scheme of sections, commentary, cross-references, and references to
27
comparable statutes.
As noted above,28 concern about the adequacy of extant water
allocation systems arises because of the growing population competing for
the same water and the recognition of needs to sustain the human
environment. One of the touted approaches for effecting a balance
between water consumption and preventing further environmental
degradation is watershed management, the subject of this symposium.29
22

An earlier Code, F.

MALONEY, R. AUSNESS, & J. MORRIS, A MODEL WATER CODE

(1972), drew on legislation in Iowa and, in turn, formed the basis for Florida legislation
adopted in 1972. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Regulated Ripariansim, in I WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS 447-48, & ch. 9 passim (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999);
Richard Ausness, The Influence of the Model Water Code on Water Resources
Management Policy in Florida, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (1987). For an even
earlier model act effort see Model Water Use Act, in WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW

533 (U. Mich. 1958).
23 See supra note 21. For information about the society, see www.asce.org.
24 The second end product, THE APPROPRIATIVE RIGHTS MODEL WATER CODE, is in the
final stages of completion. See THE APPROPRIATIVE RIGHTS MODEL WATER CODE (Final
Report, Water Laws Committee, American Society of Civil Engineers, August, 1996).
25 Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School. Professor Davis is an
expert on weather modification, having written two texts and eight articles on the subject.
See generally Robert E. Beck, Augmenting the Available Supply, in 1 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 3.04 notes 60 & 61 and accompanying text (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991
& Supp. 1999). See RRMWC at iii.
26 Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. Professor Dellapenna is an
expert on riparian water law. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Riparianism, in 1 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS 85-579 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).
27 Thus even if not enacted as a code, the Code can serve several other purposes; first, as
a checklist of items to consider for any statutory scheme, and second, as a rich
commentary on the law that now exists in the thirty-one states by means of its crossreferences, illustrations of the applications of particular provisions, and explanations of
why a particular approach was chosen over a competing approach.
See Lynda L. Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a RiparianJurisdiction:
Defining the Relationship Between Public and Private Interests, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 95,
2

96-103 (1985).
29

During the past twenty years there has been some movement toward an ecosystem

approach to water management, focusing on the watershed. See BOB DOPPETT ET AL.,
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The intent of this article is to delineate the approach, scope, and elements
covered in the Code and to recognize the criticism leveled at both common
law riparian doctrine and existing regulated riparianism statutes and
indicate how the Code responds, but doing both from the viewpoint of
identifying the potential of the Code for supporting a watershed
management approach.
While critics of riparianism go as far back as those in the West
who rejected its application in the western United States,30 I focus on the
work of three critics, Robert Abrams,3" Richard Ausness,32 and Lynda
Butler,33 because of the substantive quantity and quality of their work as
well as their differing critical contributions.
Several prerequisites seem necessary in any legal regime for
significant water resource management from a watershed management
approach.34 First, all water has to be included and all aspects of water
regulation, such as quantity allocation and quality control, must be
ENTERING THE WATERSHED: A NEW APPROACH TO SAVE AMERICA'S RIVER
ECOSYSTEMS (1993); Robert E. Beck, Introduction, Background, and Trends, in 1
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 52.06(d)(4) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).
30 See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Dual Systems, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 8.01

(Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).
3, Robert H. Abrams, Chartingthe Course of Riparianism: An Instrumentalist Theory of
Change, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1381 (1989); Robert H. Abrams, Water Allocation by
Comprehensive Permit Systems in the East: Consideringa Move Away from Orthodoxy,
9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 255 (1990); Robert H. Abrams, Replacing Riparianism in the TwentyFirst Century, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 93 (1989). These articles constitute a trilogy and are
set forth in the order that Abrams intended them to be read.
32 Frank E. Maloney & Richard C. Ausness, Administering State Water Resources: The
Need for Long-Range Planning, 73 W. VA. L. REV. 209 (1971); Richard C. Ausness,
Water Use Permits in a RiparianState: Problems and Proposals,66 KY. L.J. 191 (1977);
Richard C. Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East: A Program for Reform, 24
WM. & MARY L. REV. 547 (1983); Richard C. Ausness, The Influence of the Model
Water Code on Water Resources Management Policy in Florida, 3 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 1 (1987).
33 Lynda L. Butler, Environmental Water Rights: An Evolving Concept of Public
Property, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 323 (1990); Lynda L. Butler, Defining a Water Ethic
Through Comprehensive Reform: A Suggested Frameworkfor Analysis, 1986 U. ILL. L.
REV. 439; Lynda L. Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparian
Jurisdiction:Defining the Relationship Between Public and PrivateInterests, 47 U. PITT.

L. REV. 95 (1985).
3' See generally Robert E. Beck, Introduction, Background, and Trends, in 5 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS § 52.06(d)(4) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1998 & Supp. 1999); A. Dan
Tarlock, Reconnecting Property Rights to Watersheds, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REV. 69.
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coordinated, if not integrated. Second, there has to be meaningful
integration of environmental and ecological factors into the management
process. Third, any private rights that exist in water have to be delineated
and their nature identified, particularly the extent to which they can be
subjected to regulation in the public interest. This article considers how
each of these prerequisites fare under the Code. While the Code may
contain these basic prerequisites necessary to watershed management, it
does not insist upon the use of the watershed management approach;
rather, such a decision would come through the comprehensive planning
process provided for by the Code. Therefore, that comprehensive planning
process is explored in this article as well.
II. WATER RESOURCE AND REGULATORY ASPECTS COVERED BY THE CODE
The very first section of the Code declares that the "waters of the
State" are owned by the State in trust for the public and subject to the
state's regulatory power to protect the public interest.35 Waters of the
State are defined to encompass the entire hydrologic cycle: "all waters, on
the surface, under the ground, and in the atmosphere, wholly within or
bordering the State or within the jurisdiction of the State."36 In that
context of covering all waters, the Code establishes the principle that the
Code and all regulatory activities pursuant to the Code are to be
interpreted "to conform to the physical laws which govern the natural
'
occurrence, movement, and storage of water."37
The most frequent critics of the law's failure to look at the reality
of the hydrologic cycle, particularly as it concerns the interconnection
between surface waters and groundwater, have been scientists." The law,
however, did not divide surface waters and groundwater into different
regimes because we did not know about the interconnection; the law
divided them because we lacked the wherewithal to determine the nature
of the interconnection in specific cases.39 Thus where we could determine
that an underground stream existed by examining surface manifestations,

11 RRMWC

§ 1R- 1-01.

Id. § 2R-2-32.
1d. § 1R-1-03.
31 See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights, in 1 WATERS
AND WATER
RIGHTS § 6.02, text accompanying note 341 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).
" See Robert E. Beck, The Legal Regimes, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 4.05(c)
(Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999); Earl Finbar Murphy, Geology and Hydrology,
in 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 18.01 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).
36

37
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we treated it as a surface stream.4" Where we otherwise knew the
interconnection, we treated the sources accordingly.41 In all other cases,
we applied limiting doctrine to groundwater that did not require us to look
underground, such as the methods for preventing waste42 and malicious
use.43 Even today it might be too expensive to look underground to solve
a particular problem." But any effort to provide rational management of
the water resource from a watershed approach needs to look at all aspects
of the resource and certainly there is strong argument that application of
the same principles to all water fosters efficiency in management.45
There has been some movement to connect the management of
surface waters and groundwater in statutes that have already been
enacted.46 For example, when courts in Illinois47 and Vermont48 declined
to abandon those states' perceived adherence to the absolute ownership
doctrine for groundwater in favor of the reasonable use rule then being
applied to surface waters, the legislatures stepped in. The responsive
Illinois statute4 9 stated simply that "[t]he rule of 'reasonable use' shall
apply to groundwater withdrawals in the State"50 and then defined
'reasonable use' as meaning "the use of water to meet natural wants and a
fair share for artificial wants."'" When the Illinois appellate court first
considered the statute,52 it identified the legislature's purpose: "By using
the terms 'natural wants' and 'artificial wants' in the definition of
reasonable use in the Act . . . the legislature has adopted the same
4 See Earl Finbar Murphy, Legal Classifications, in 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §
20.07(a) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).
41 Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 18 N. Y. App. Div. 340, 46 N.Y.S. 141, 144 (1897).
42
See Peter N. Davis, Wells and Streams: Relationship at Law, 37 Mo. L. REV. 189, 202-

03 (1972).

43See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES

§ 4:6 (2000).

" See Peter N. Davis, Wells and Streams: Relationship at Law, 37 MO. L. REv. 189, 23438 (1972).
41See

Richard C. Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East: A Programfor Reform,

24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 547, 579-581 (1983).

"See the commentary in the Code, RRMWC at 73.
47 Lee

v. City of Pontiac, 99 Ill. App. 3d 982, 426 N.E.2d 300 (4"' Dist. 1981).

4'Drinkwine v. State, 131 Vt. 127, 300 A.2d 616 (1973).
49 Water Use Act of 1983, Pub. Act 83-700 (codified at

525 ILCS 45/1 to 45/7). The

Vermont statute is at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1410 (added in 1985). "It is the policy of

the State that the common-law doctrine of absolute ownership of groundwater is hereby
abolished." Id. § 1410(a)(5).
SO525 ILCS 45/6.
525 ILCS 45/4(g).
52Bridgman v. Sanitary
SI

District, 164 Il1.App. 3d 287, 517 N.E.2d 309 (4t' Dist. 1987).
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standards for groundwater as that which applies to surface water
withdrawals ....53
Despite the seeming inclusiveness of "all waters" as defined in the
Code, not all waters are necessarily subject to allocation under the Code. 4
The Code provides for two types of waters that may be exempted from
allocation; "certain shared waters""5 and "small water sources," 6 and one
type of water which is not to be allocated; "protected minimum flows or
levels."57
No matter how devoutly a state might wish it, the state does not
have complete control over the water within the state in whatever form it
appears. Any realistic code must take this lack of control into account.
Thus those waters managed by federal mandate,5" under interstate
compact59 or under international treaty 6' would be recognized as such, and
as to those waters any allocation by the state agency would proceed only if
consistent with the mandate, compact or treaty.6' However, the Code does

53Id.

at 293, 517 N.E.2d at 313.

RRMWC § 3R-1-01 declares that "all waters of the State" are subject to allocation

under the Code unless expressly exempted in Chapter HI of the Code. However, not all
users of water under the Code may need to have a permit. See infra Part IV of this
article.
55RRMWC
§ 3R-1-02.
56
1d. § 3R-1-03.
"Id. § 3R-2-01.
38 Federal laws are "the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. Art. VI § 2.
The federal
government exercises considerable jurisdiction in (1) pollution control, (2) ecosystem
protection, (3) protecting navigability, and (4) constructing and managing reservoirs. As
to pollution control, see infra note 70. As to ecosystem protection, see, e.g., Clean Water

Act § 404, 33 USC § 1344 & Wild and Scenic Rivers, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287. As to
navigability, see Navigation and Navigable Waters, 33 U.S.C. tit. 33. As to constructing
and managing reservoirs, see William L. Andreen, Alabama, in 6 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS 185, 190-191 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1994 & Supp. 1999); James L. Bross,
Georgia, in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 301, 310-311 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1994 &
Supp. 1999); J.

THORSON, RIVER OF PROMISE, RIVER OF PERIL: THE POLITICS OF

MANAGING THE MISSOURI RIVER passim (1994).

" See Douglas L. Grant, Water Apportionment Compacts Between States, in 4 WATERS
AND

WATER RIGHTS § 46.01 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1996 & Supp. 1999); Robert E. Beck,

Introduction, Background, and Trends, in 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 52.06(c)(1)

(Robert E. Beck ed., 1998).
6 See generally Albert E. Utton, Canadian International Waters, in 5 WATERS
WATER RIGHTS 51-97 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1998 & Supp. 1999).
61RRMWC § 3R-1-02.

AND
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place an affirmative duty on state agencies to cooperate with federal
agencies and with compact- and treaty-created agencies.62
The optional Code provision relating to small water sources in
effect gives the land owner control over the diffused surface water that
arises on the land.63 As a general rule under the common law, diffused
surface waters are not treated as waters subject to riparian principles."
However, the language used in the Code limits the water included in the
exception to water (1) originating on the landowner's land, (2) not drawn
from an eight-acre or larger basin, and (3) being used on the landowner's
land. 5 The commentary in the Code points out that this exemption can be
viewed from a de minimis perspective as well.66
The purpose and status of minimum flows or levels will be
considered in Part III of this article.67 It only needs to be pointed out here
that because some of those waters can be allocated during a water
emergency, the protection for such flows or levels is not absolute.6"
When different agencies within the state have different
responsibilities relative to the water resource, the Code can and does do
more, particularly with the often separated water quality control versus
water quantity allocation." While the Code mandates coordination, it does
not set out specific quality control measures. Considering the expansive
extant base for water quality protection in several federal statutes,7" an
62

Id. § 4R-3-01.

63

Id. § 3R-1-03.

1 Joseph W. Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights, in 1 WATERS AND WATER

RIGHTS § 6.02 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999). Usually diffused surface
waters were viewed as unwanted and something, therefore, to be eliminated. This
resulted in the law relating to drainage. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Related Systems of
Water Rights, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 10.03 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 &
Supp. 1999); Peter N. Davis, Drainage,in 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 59 (Robert
E. Beck ed., 1998 & Supp. 1999).
65

RRMWC § 3R-1-03.

RRMWC at 79.
See infra text accompanying notes 160-176.
68 See infra text accompanying notes 174-175.
69 Other deviations may exist; for example, some states assign weather modification
6

67

duties to agriculture departments. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS § 295.105; PA. STAT.

ANN. tit. 3, §§ 1103, 1104.
7 See, e.g., The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387; Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26; RCRA Subch. IX, §§ 6991-6991k. The Safe Drinking Water
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26, contains several programs that assist in maintaining the
integrity of underground water supplies, particularly the underground injection control

program, §§ 300h to 300h-8, the sole source aquifer protection program, § 300h-6, and
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effort to restate those rules within the Code is unnecessary and probably
would do no more than create an excessively heavy volume. Nor does the
Code insist that one agency handle both. What a code does need to do and
what this Code does is to provide awareness of the need for integration
and coordination, specify particularly the circumstances in which this
needs to be accomplished, 7 and indicate how this can be accomplished.
In doing so, the Code reflects the view articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in PUD No. 1 v. Washington Department of
Ecology:72
"Petitioners ... assert... that the Clean Water Act is only

concerned with water 'quality' and does not allow the
regulation of water 'quantity.'
This is an artificial
distinction. In many cases, water quantity is closely related
to water quality; a sufficient lowering of water quantity in a
body of water could destroy all of its desired uses, be it for
drinking water, recreation, navigation or, as here, as a
fishery."73
Although the Code provides in the Declarations of Policy that "the State
shall coordinate the plans, laws, regulations, and decisions pertaining to
water allocation with those pertaining to water quality,"'74 the primary
effort comes in the chapter on establishing a water right,75 where one part
is devoted specifically to "[c]oordination of Water Allocation and Water
Quality Regulation."76 There the Code puts the basic duty on the quantity
agency to allocate water in a manner that will "protect and preserve the

the wellhead protection program, § 300h-7. The RCRA citation is to the underground

storage tank program.

See generally D. GETCHES, ET AL., CONTROLLING WATER USE: THE
UNFINISHED
Ausness, supra note 45, at
579-81, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 547, 579-581 (1983).
71

BUSINESS OF WATER QUALITY PROTECTION passim (1991);
72 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
73

1Id. at

74

719. See also the commentary to RRMWC § 1R-1-09.
RRMWC § 1R-1-09. However, the coordination provision preserves private rights
of

action, particularly the rights of persons to seek suppression of nuisances or to use other
pollution abatement remedies. RRMWC § 6R-04 (sic)-05.
75 RRMWC ch. VI.
76

RRMWC ch. VI, pt. 4. This part is written on the assumption that different state

agencies handle allocation and quality control and would require language adjustment if
one agency handles both functions. See RRMWC at 254.
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quality of those waters," ' and not to allocate water to a use "that appears
78
likely to result in a violation" of the State's water quality standards
without consulting the quality control agency.79 If the quality agency
objects to a proposed quantity allocation and the allocation agency goes
ahead with the allocation, the quality agency can pursue the matter through
the state's regular interagency dispute resolution mechanism.8" In order to
facilitate the performance of these duties, the allocation agency is required
to maintain within the statewide data system8 a variety of water quality
related information to be supplied by the quality control agency.82
To further the evaluation process, the Code provides (1) that the
quantity agency is to establish and implement standards and procedures
that accomplish coordination in four specific instances, 3 (2) guidance on
evaluating quantity allocations for their potential effect on water quality,8
and (3) guidance on combining water quantity and water quality permits.8"
The first specific instance for which the agency is to establish
standards and procedures is where a withdrawal of water from the source
may affect the volume of flow in waters that receive effluent discharges.8"
A case from Colorado8 7 factually illustrates the problem nicely. In this
case, Kodak had a permit to withdraw water from a stream for waste
treatment purposes and a permit to discharge wastewater into the stream.
The City of Thornton applied for and received a permit to withdraw water
from the stream above Kodak's discharge point. Kodak had argued that
with the City's withdrawal from the stream, the stream could no longer
assimilate Kodak's wastewater discharge. This would cause Kodak to be
77 RRMWC § 6R-4-01(l).
78

States adopt water quality standards pursuant to the Clean Water Act (CWA). CWA, 33

U.S.C. § 1313. See Robert E. Beck & C. Peter Goplerud, The Water Quality Approach in
5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 54.02 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1998 & Supp. 1999).
79
RRMWC § 6R-4-01(2).
80 Id. § 6R-4-01(3).
"IThis system is created pursuant to RRMWC § 4R-2-03. Abrams points out the need for
data collection, particularly of water use patterns, of stream flow, of storage, and of

recharge. Robert H. Abrams, Water Allocation by Comprehensive Permit Systems in the
East: Consideringa Move Awayfrom Orthodoxy, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 255, 279 (1990).
82 RRMWC § 6R-4-02.
83 Id. § 6R-4-03(l).
"85 Id. § 6R-4-03.

Id. § 6R-4-04.

86

Id. § 6R-4-03(l)(a).

See also Peter N. Davis, Protecting Waste Assimilation

Streamflows by the Law of Water Allocation, Nuisance, and Public Trust, and by
Environmental Statutes, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 357 (1988).
87 City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 91-95 (Colo. 1996).
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in violation of the Clean Water Act, forcing Kodak to spend $9 to $12
million to redo its waste treatment system. The Colorado Supreme Court
rejected Kodak's argument on the basis that it had not acquired a water
right to maintain the assimilative capacity of the stream, only to withdraw
water from the stream for treatment purposes."
The second instance for which the agency must establish and
implement standards and procedures that accomplish coordination is when
the water to be allocated will result in return flow that will carry with it
any category of pollutant regulated by either federal or state statutes or
regulations.89 The third instance is when withdrawal of groundwater
would cause a zone of depression that results in a threat of the intrusion of
saline water, hazardous wastes or other pollutants into the groundwater
supply.90 The final instance is when artificial recharge of groundwater
appears likely to create a risk that any category of pollutant regulated by
federal or state statute or regulations will enter the groundwater. 9'
In addition to requiring the establishment and implementation of
the standards and procedures in these four instances, the Code lists seven
factors for the quantity agency to consider in determining the impact that
any allocation might have on the quality of waters in the water source. 92
The seven factors that must be considered are: (1) nature, size and
safe yield of the source; 93 (2) biological and chemical effects of
degradation of water quality resulting from proposed allocation by itself or
in combination with other existing, permitted, or planned uses which
adversely affect the availability or fitness of the water for other uses; 94 (3)
injuries to public health, safety or welfare or to environmental quality and
integrity if the degradation is not prevented or abated; 9 (4) need for the
withdrawal and cost of an alternative source;9 6 (5) extent of adverse quality
effects on other uses and the amount of remedial costs necessary to
mitigate those effects; 97 (6) effect on waste assimilative capacity under

8 Id.

9 RRMWC § 6R-4-03(1)(b).
" Id. § 6R-4-03(1)(c).
91 Id. § 6R-4-03(l)(d).
92 Id. § 6R-4-03(2).
' Id. § 6R-4-03(2)(a). Safe yield is discussed infra text accompanying notes 179-181.
94 RRMWC § 6R-4-03(2)(b).
Ild. § 6R-4-03(2)(c).
6 d.
§ 6R-4-03(2)(d).
97 Id. § 6R-4-03(b)(e).
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subsection 3; 9' and (7) any other impact on public interest and sustainable
development.99
Finally, subsection 3,' °° referred to in item (6) above, requires the
agency to determine the effect of the allocation on the capacity of the
source to assimilate effluent from point and nonpoint sources, balancing
the cost of additional pollution control against the cost of losses imposed
on other users (actual or potential) of source waters by the impact.
The guidance on combining permits states that "[w]henever
consistent with" the policies and requirements of the Code, the quantity
agency and the quality agency "shall issue a combined permit" that
contains the terms and conditions for both.' 0' If the quantity agency
determines that a combined permit is not possible, that agency is required
to (1) publish a notice of intent to issue a permit, (2) send written notice to
the quality agency, and (3) issue the permit as planned unless precluded by
order of a court or other body authorized to review the decision.'0 2
Ill.

ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECOLOGICAL VALUES UNDER THE CODE

Common law riparian doctrine did make some contribution to
protecting environmental and ecological values. It included water quality
as an aspect of water allocation. 3 It also recognized recreation, wildlife
and even aesthetics as reasonable uses, all of which would result in
keeping water in the stream or lake."° Indeed, a principal reason that
western courts and legislatures rejected riparianism was that they believed
that it would leave too much water flowing in stream, and water that
reached the ocean was considered wasted. 5
Obviously had the
riparianism flirtation with natural flow0 6 been developed and maintained,
9

Id. § 6R-4-03(b)(f). See infra text accompanying note 100.

9 RRMWC § 6R-4-03(b)(g).

1oo Id. § 6R-4-03(3).
01 Id. § 6R-4-04

Id. § 6R-4-04(2)(a)-(c).
See also Joseph W. Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights, in 1 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 6.01(a)(3) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).
103

104 Id.

05As recently as 1966, the Nebraska Supreme Court wrote: "It is axiomatic that waters

which flow beyond the points of use to the sea are lost and constitute a form of waste,

which is against public policy." In re Metropolitan Utilities Dist. of Omaha, 140 N.W.2d
626, 637 (Neb. 1966).
106 Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water Under 'Pure' RiparianRights, in
1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.02(c) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).

126
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it would have meant even greater ecosystem protection. However, even
the western authorities recognized that considerable stream flow had to be
maintained in any reasonable water use system. Otherwise, there would
not be enough water available to the downstream users, who had a water
use right equal to any of the water's other users' rights. 7
However, the eastern states interfered early on with natural flow,
not only by putting the focus of the common law doctrine on reasonable
use, but also in other ways. Under early doctrine riparian land was limited
to land owned abutting the water, 10 8 and the outer limits of riparian land
were the watershed boundaries."° However, many courts changed their
doctrine to accommodate use on nonriparian land as long as a riparian user
was not injured.110 This change could be justified on the basis that the
happenstance of ownership was artificial and that the entire watershed
contributed to the source, but the latter justification would not extend use
outside the watershed. Nevertheless, states began to ignore even the
watershed limitation,"' just as the United States Supreme Court apparently
did in fashioning decrees allocating interstate waters among eastern
states.
Other state interference with riparian doctrine came early in
enacting mill dam statutes,"' in draining swamps," 4 and in providing for
municipal water supplies, often by damming or diverting a stream."'
1o7

See infra note 281 for the description of the common law riparian right. Inefficiency

in delivery and use of water had protected environmental and ecological values.
Increasing demand led to efforts at attaining efficiency in water use; this efficiency gives

rise to the need for express recognition and protection of the environmental and
ecological values. It is wrong to remove inefficiencies that protect these values without
providing substituted protection in the process.
'o' See Butler, supra note 28, at 161-64; Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume
Water Under 'Pure' Riparian Rights, in I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.02(a)(1)
(Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).

"oSee Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water Under 'Pure' Riparian
Rights, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.02(a)(2) (R. Beck ed. 1991 & Supp. 1999).
"' See supra note 108.
..See Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87 (1913).
"2 See Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 336 (1931) (finding against Connecticut

for failing to prove injury, despite allegation of diversion of water beyond watershed).
"' See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism,in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 9.02(a) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).
"" See Robert E. Beck, Background, in 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 727-29 (Robert
E. Beck ed., 1998 & Supp. 1999).
'" See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water Under 'Pure' Riparian
Rights, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.05(c)(1) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 &
Supp. 1999).
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These and other human interventions caused considerable changes to
ecosystems." 6 Today there is all the more pressure to preserve those
ecosystems that have not been greatly changed by human intervention and
to restore some that have.17
Lynda Butler"' sums up the focus as follows: "As the demand for
out-of-stream uses continues to rise, the need for protection of instream
uses 19 has become increasingly apparent." 2 ' The reason for the concern is
clear: "[d]espite the need for protection of instream uses, out-of-stream
uses have, for the most part, prevailed in both western and eastern
states.''. Butler recognizes that there have been positive developments in
the law, enough "to establish the basic legitimacy of the public interest in
environmental water uses, ' but that little guidance has been provided on
how the public interest should be protected and what impact it would have
on those pre-existing private rights. In an earlier article,'23 she discussed
why then current proposals for reform had failed and found that it was
"because they do not consider key factors and concerns."' 24 "[R]eformists
must define and develop a responsible water ethic ...that balances factors
.6 See Howard v. City of Buffalo, 211 N.Y. 241, 264, 105 N.E. 426, 433 (1914).
It7
As to restoration, perhaps the best known examples are Mono Lake in the west and the
current effort in the Everglades in the east. See Michael L. Davis, Rescuing an
EndangeredEcosystem: The Plan to Restore America's Everglades, NAT'L

WETLANDS

NEWSL., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 11.
"' Lynda L. Butler, Environmental Water Rights: An Evolving Concept of Public

Property, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 323 (1990).

See also Lynda L. Butler, Allocating

Consumptive Water Rights in a RiparianJurisdiction:Defining the RelationshipBetween
Public and PrivateInterests, 47 U. PITT. L. REv. 95 (1985).

9 As instream uses she notes environmental preservation, ecological appreciation, and
recreational pursuits. Lynda L. Butler, Environmental Water Rights: An Evolving
Concept of Public Property,9 VA. ENVT'L. L.J. 323,365 (1990).
120 Id. at 324.

Id.
" Id. at 352. For her the expanding public interest has come about through both judicial
and legislative forms. The judicial developments include expansions of the public trust
doctrine, id. at 331-336, of the definition of navigability, id. at 337-340, and of the
federal reserved water rights doctrine, id. at 341-343. The legislative developments
include statutory recognition of instream water rights and a public interest standard in
applying traditional allocation doctrines, id. at 344-48, establishment of minimum flows,
id. at 348-350, and indirect protection of instream values such as through wild and scenic
iver designations, id. at 350-51.
121

Lynda L. Butler, Defining a Water Ethic Through Comprehensive Reform: A
Suggested
Frameworkfor Analysis, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 439.
24
' d.at 440.
123
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and concerns falling into one of three general categories:"' 25 (1) efficiency;
(2) equitable or fairness considerations; and (3) environmental values. 6
"An effective system needs a better perspective on environmental
objectives" and "must better internalize environmental values in the
allocation process."' 27 The reforms present at that time contained only
vague policy statements like "in the public interest,"'28 and even when
environmental requirements were imposed, such as requirements for
minimum flows, the standards by which they were to be set were equally
vague. 129 Furthermore, environmental values tended to appear as
exceptions to a general development goal, 3 ' when what was needed was
clear integration of environmental values into the system.' To the extent
that integration results in the preservation of the resource, it has the
additional benefit of saving the resource for future generations."3 Butler
recognizes that there are uncertainties associated with some environmental
risks because of a lack of data, causing precision to be problematic.'33 In
discussing the internalizing of environmental values, she considers the
public trust doctrine as a possible focal point but notes that in most states
courts have not gone very far in developing the doctrine, and to simply
refer to it in the legislation as a standard may do nothing but create
confusion.'34 What states need to do is to develop a lot of specificity in
their environmental goals in relation to the water resource and their
methods for achieving those goals.'
However, it is not until her
36
subsequent article,' that she develops the view that the "application of the
public property concept to environmental water uses would move the
evolutionary process from the legitimation.37 to the integration stage."' 38
Id.

125
26
'

Id.at 441. Only the third one is reviewed here.

27

' Id. at 468.
128Id.

129

Butler, supra note 123, at 470.

30

1 id.

131
Id.at
32

1

471-2.

Id. at 472.

Id.at 474-75. As to Code provisions on data collecting, see supra note 81 and infra
note
196.
134 Id. at 476-78.
135Butler, supra note 123, at 479.
136
Butler, supra note 119, at 323, discussed supra text accompanying notes 118-122.
137 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
13 Butler, supra note 119, at 355. Compare Thompson's "environmental water account"
13

and use of watershed ecoservice districts to capitalize on ecosystem service values.
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129

Butler there discusses instream water use as public property focusing on
both utilitarian and nonutilitarian justifications.139 And thus, again, we are
back to the subtheme of this symposium: watershed management.
Watershed management is an ecosystem approach to
management. 40 In line with the general perception that the eastern states
are richer in water than the western states, 4 ' a 1999 study has pointed out
42
that the eastern states have generally more diverse ecosystems as well.
In measuring overall species richness in freshwater ecosystems, the study
used the estimated ranges of 2,200 North American species representing
five taxonomic groups; fishes, crayfishes, unionid mussels, amphibians
that depend on aquatic habitats, and aquatic and semi-aquatic reptiles. 43 It
concluded: "the highest number of species occurs in the Southeast and
mid-Atlantic."' 44 As Tarlock and Thompson point out, watershed
145
management looks to concurrent regulation of water use and land use.
The underlying notion is that managing to preserve the watershed can help
preserve the species. 4 The question is whether watershed management
can accommodate human consumptive use.
While the Code begins 47 with a recognition that the waters of the
state are owned by the state 48 in trust for the public and subject to the
Barton H. Thompson, Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
261.
139 Butler discusses Carol Rose's article dealing with public property concepts, noting

limitations imposed by Rose and suggesting that they are too narrowing and that this
occurs because Rose focuses on economic preconditions when, as Butler believes,
"political theory and democratic values" can be used as well to justify public property
rights. Butler, supra note 119, at 364.
140 Robert E. Beck, Introduction, Background, and Trends, in 5 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 52.06(d)(4) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1998 & Supp. 1999).
14'As we seemingly have been told forever, the eastern United States is much richer in
water than the western United States. Indeed this perceived fact has been used to justify
fundamentally different water use allocation schemes in the two regions; riparianism in

the East and prior appropriation in the West.
142

See R. ABELL ET AL., FRESHWATER ECOREGIONS OF NORTH AMERICA:

A

CONSERVATION ASSESSMENT (1999) (studying variations in ecosystem diversity in the
United
States).
143
Id. at 15.

,"Id.at 25. See also id. at 26, figures 3.1 to 3.3.
"4 A. Dan Tarlock, Reconnecting Property Rights to Watersheds, 25 WM. & MARY
ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 69; See generallyThompson, supra note 138.
"4Robert E. Beck, Introduction, Background, and Trends, in 5 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 52.06(d)(4) (Robert E.Beck ed., 1998 & Supp. 1999).
,41 See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
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state's regulatory powers to protect the public interest, the Code clearly
recognizes, as it must, both "economic growth" and "preventing excessive
degradation of natural environments" as goals in the public interest.149 So
how does the Code draw the line between the tendency of each to undo the
other? The formal definition of "the public interest"'5 ° in the Code
imposes only two limitations, which the commentary in the Code
characterizes as "minimal restraints."'' To come within "public interest"
an interest is to be "broadly shared" and "capable of protection or
regulation by law."' 2
Clearly, environmental or ecological goals are broadly shared.'53
Whether they are capable of protection or regulation by law can be tested
by considering how the Code regulates to prevent "excessive degradation
of the environment."" 4 For a person who needs a permit to withdraw
water from a source,' 5 the Code requires that before approving any
withdrawal of water, the agency must consider the general effects that the
proposed withdrawal of water would have"5 6 on the environment, ecology
and aesthetics,' and then the specific effects the withdrawal might have
on sustainable development, on recharge areas for underground water, on
waste assimilation capacity and other water quality aspects, and on
wetlands and flood plains. 5 ' All of the categories relate directly or
indirectly to environmental and ecological protection. Of course, with the

148

While declared state ownership of water may not insulate a state from having to share

the resource with other states, the concept still provides a useable approach to regulation
of the resource. For a discussion of state ownership of resources in the interstate context,
see Douglas L. Grant, State Regulation of Interstate Water Export, in 4 WATERS
WATER RIGHTS § 48.03(a)(1) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1996 & Supp. 1999).

AND

RRMWC § IR-1-01. These are two of the seven public interest items the Code
recognizes in this section. The remaining five are noted in connection with the
sustainable development concept. See infra note 179.
'41

150

RRMWC § 2R-2-18.

51
' Id.

15 2

at 50.

Id. § 2R-2-18.
"' See supra note 33.
154 See supra text accompanying note 149.

' See infra Part IV of this article.
156

RRMWC § 6R-3-02(e).

In the commentary to RRMWC § 2R-2-18, this section

(02(e)) is incorrectly identified as 02(c). The agency is not limited to considering just
those seven categories or uses. Id.
157 RRMWC § 6R-3-02(e)(1).
8 Id. § 6R-3-02(e)(2),
(4)-(7).
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economic growth parameter, the agency must also consider the effect on
domestic and municipal uses' 9
The Code also requires that the agency set minimum flows or
levels for surface and underground waters"6 that as a general rule will not
be subject to allocation under the Code.' 6 ' This minimum is to be the
largest amount among those that are necessary for maintaining biological,
chemical, and physical integrity of the water source, taking into account
seasonal variations in flow and need. 62 These integrities are taken from
the goals of the Clean Water Act.'63 Biological integrity refers to
supporting wetlands and wildlife insofar as protection of either is required
by state or federal laws or regulations.' Chemical integrity refers to
maintaining the volume necessary to meet the water quality standards
prescribed by state or federal law or regulations, taking into account the
discharges and other impacts the water source will face.'65 Physical
integrity refers to the volume of water necessary to (1) support commercial
navigation required by state or federal law or regulation,'66 (2) preserve
natural, cultural or historic resources as required under state or federal law
or regulations, 67 (3) provide adequate recreational opportunities for the
people of the state, 68 and (4) prevent serious depletion or exhaustion of
the water source.'69
All water users who have a water right under the Code have the
obligation to protect those minimum flows or levels.'
The Code
prohibits the withdrawal of water where the withdrawal would impair the
minimum flow or level of the source without authorization from the
agency or from a court.' A person proposing to withdraw water has the

Id. § 6R-3-02(e)(3).
I5
160
161

Id. III, pt. 2.
Id. § 3R-2-01(I). See infra text accompanying notes 174-175.

162 RRMWC § 3R-2-02.
63
1 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387. See RRMWC
at 48.

164
RRMWC § 2R-2-02.
165 Id. § 2R-2-03.

" Id. § 2R-2-16(a).
167

168
169

170

Id. § 2R-2-16(b).
Id. § 2R-2-16(c).
Id. § 2R-2-16(d).
RRMWC § 3R-2-01(2).

Because water right is defined in the Code as a right to

withdraw water whether a permit is needed or not, id. RRMWC § 2R-2-30, all who could
interfere with minimum flows or levels are covered by the obligation.
17

Id. § 3R-2-04(2).
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burden of showing that the withdrawal will not impair the minimum flow
172
or level of the source.
When a threat to a minimum flow or level arises, the agency may
declare either a water shortage or a water emergency, t 7' each involving
appropriate action to follow. During an emergency, but not during a
shortage, the agency can invade the minimum flow or level and allocate
some water, but only "to prevent serious injuries" to other uses and only if
the allocation will not "permanently impair" any of the integrities. 74
Furthermore, the agency must determine in advance the emergency
minimum flows or levels that can be allocated only "to prevent grave
threats to human life or health," but even then those flows are allocated
only if water is not available from any other source to cope with these
75
needs. 1
The agency may also protect flows or levels by seeking additional
water for that purpose. The Code authorizes the agency to contract with
water use permit holders to provide water for additional flows or levels
76
and to pay for that water out of the State Water Fund.
The protection of ecological and environmental values is furthered
also by the adoption of "sustainable development" as an underlying or
pervasive theme of the Code. 177
The Code defines sustainable
172 Id. § 3R-2-04(1).
17 Id. § 3R-2-03(1).
174 1d.
17IId.

§ 3R-2-03(2).

§ 3R-2-03(3).
176 RRMWC § 3R-2-05. The State Water Fund is established under RRMWC § 4R-104(1). There are several possible sources under the Code for monies to be contributed to
the Fund. For example, the agency is to establish a schedule of reasonable water use fees
based on the value of water used, id. RRMWC § 4R-1-08, and all persons who withdraw
water under a permit issued under the Code must be charged a water use fee. Professor
Abrams discusses the importance of charging for water. Robert H. Abrams, supra note
81, at 282.
17 The phrase or a variant thereof occurs in eighteen discrete sections or subsections
of
the Code. RRMWC § 1R-l-02 ("in a sustainable manner"); RRMWC § IR-l-04
("establishing and maintaining sustainable development"); RRMWC § 2R-2-20
("consistently with ... sustainable development"); RRMWC § 2R-2-24 (definition of
"sustainable development"); RRMWC § 4R-2-01(2) ("for achieving sustainable
development"); RRMWC § 4R-4-01(c) ("the sustainable development of total regional
water resources"); RRMWC § 4R-4-02(3)(a) ("the public interest in sustainable
development"); RRMWC § 6R-3-02(e) ("the probable effects ...on ... (2) sustainable
development"); RRMWC § 6R-3-04(1)(c) ("the overall goal of sustainable
development"); RRMWC § 6R-3-06(l) ("impair the sustainable development");
RRMWC § 6R-4-03(2)(g) ("any other impact on . . . sustainable development");
RRMWC § 7R-I-01(l) ("to be necessary to protect . . . sustainable development");
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development as "the integrated management of resources taking seriously78
the needs of future generations as well as the current generation,1
assuring equitable access to resources, optimizing the use of nonrenewable resources, and averting the exhaustion of renewable
resources."' 179 While this definition does not 'specifically refer to
environmental or ecological values, by treating water as a renewable
resource and limiting withdrawal to "safe yield,"' 8 0 while defining safe
yield as water that can be withdrawn from a water source without

impairing the long-term social utility of the source, including its protected
biological, chemical, and physical integrities,"8 ' -the Code reinforces
protection of ecological and environmental goals. Safe yield is not a new
concept to water resource law and management, as it has been for some
82
time a focus of aquifer management.1

RRMWC § 7R-3-06(3) ("does not unreasonably impair... sustainable development");
RRMWC § 7R-3-06(4) ("does not unreasonably impair... sustainable development");
RRMWC § 8R-1-01 ("consistent... with the sustainable development of the waters");
RRMWC § 8R-1-05(l)(c) ("are not detrimental to the ... sustainable development of the
waters"); RRMWC § 8R-1-06 ("consistent with the sustainable development of the
waters"); RRMWC § 9R-1-02(2) ("will not unreasonably injure ... the sustainable
development of the waters.").
.78
The 1996 President's Council on Sustainable Development, infra note 185, focuses on
this aspect in defining sustainable development. Butler discusses the importance of
intergenerational equity in the management of the water resource. Butler, supra note
123, at 458-79.
9 RRMWC § 2R-2-24. Furthermore, the sustainable development theme is supported
through the public ownership provision in the Code, see supra text accompanying notes
35-36, 147-149, where the Code delineates the scope of public interest as including (1)
promoting economic growth, (2) mitigating harmful effects of drought, (3) resolving
conflict among competing users, (4) achieving balance between consumptive and
nonconsumptive uses, (5) encouraging conservation, (6) preventing excessive
environmental degradation, and (7) enhancing the productivity of water related activity.
RRMWC § 1R-1-01. Resolving conflict among competing users of a common resource
was the first basis that the United States Supreme Court recognized to justify regulation

of a common resource. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900): "[T]he law... is a
statute protecting private property and preventing it from being taken by one of the

common owners without regard to the enjoyment of others." Id. at 210. The 1996
President's Council on Sustainable Development, infra note 185, focuses on this aspect
in defining sustainable development. Butler discusses the importance of intergenerational
equity in the management of the water resource. Butler, supra note 123, at 458-79.
I8O

RRMWC § 6R-3-01(l)(b).

182Id. § 2R-2-21.
282 Use of groundwater from an aquifer in excess of recharge is known as groundwater
mining; in that context safe yield imports not exceeding aquifer recharge. See generally

134
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During the past decade there has been a growing acceptability of
sustainable development as a relevant concept in water resource
management, both as to allocation of use and as to pollution control.'83
The U.N. embraces the concept from a world-wide perspective.'1 4 The
President's Council on Sustainable Development endorses it,'85 as does the
Aspen Institute," 6 and the Western Water Policy Advisory Commission
recognizes its relevance.8 7 As Professor Thompson shows, 88 it is even a
part of New York City's new watershed management plan. 89
Some of these authorities appear to define sustainable development
more broadly than the Code does. For example, the National Commission
on the Environment' 9 defines sustainable development directly as the
cornerstone of both economic and environmental policy. 9 ' In the
Commission's view, economic growth should allow for protection and
even restoration of the environment.'
Similarly, an editorial in U.S.
Water News defines sustainable development as not using "water
resources to the extent they are destroyed or to the extent they destroy the
habitat or ecosystem."' 93 The Code appears to speak only of preventing
unnecessary degradation, but because the Code protects the biological,
Earl Finbar Murphy, Geology and Hydrology, in 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 18.04
(Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).
183 See generally Symposium, Sustainable Development, 12 NATURAL RESOURCES
&

ENV'T (Fall 1997); Symposium, Framework Laws-The Key to Sustainable Development
in the Americas, 13 PACE ENVT'L L. REv. 495 (1996).
SSeeUNITED NATIONS, INDICATORS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK AND

METHODOLOGIES (1996).
185 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, SUSTAINABLE
AMERICA: A
NEW CONSENSUS FOR PROSPERITY, OPPORTUNITY, AND A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT

(1996).
THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, THE ALTERNATIVE PATH: A CLEANER, CHEAPER WAY TO
PROTECT AND ENHANCE THE ENVIRONMENT (1996).
186

WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION, WATER IN THE WEST:
THE CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY l-xxxix (Public Review Draft, Oct. 1997).
188 Thompson, supra note 138.
187

New York Adopts Comprehensive Watershed Plan, U.S. WATER NEWS, July 1996, at
13, col. 1. See Jayne E. Daly, The Protection of New York City's Drinking Water, 1995
PACE L. REv. 63.
89

o CHOOSING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
THE ENVIRONMENT (1993).
'9'

Id. at 1-9.

192 ld.

"9 Sustainable Development Will Foster Hydro-Solutions, U.S.

1996, at 6.
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chemical, and physical integrities of the water source,'94 the Code supports
the broad goals of these other definitions. However, under the Code, the
details for sustainable development will be worked out in the planning
process. The Code requires a "comprehensive water allocation plan,' 195
the objective of which is specifically to "collect data 96 and devise
strategies for achieving sustainable development of the waters of the
State."'

197

As a necessary part of achieving sustainable development, the
Code provides for water conservation as another underlying or pervasive
theme.'98 The purpose of conservation is to assist in sustaining the
resource. Conserved water may go directly to the ecosystem, or it may
simply free water for additional consumptive uses, without having such
additional uses inflict more ecological or environmental damage.'9
RRMWC § 2R-2-21(l) (by so defining the safe yield to which water source
withdrawals are limited). Safe yield is measured by comparing natural and artificial
replenishment with existing and planned consumptive and nonconsumptive uses.
RRMWC § 2R-2-21(2). See supra text accompanying notes 180-182.
194

'

95

196

See infra Part V of this article.

Abrams points out the need for data collection, particularly of water use patterns, of

stream flow, of storage, and of recharge. Robert H. Abrams, Water Allocation by
Comprehensive Permit Systems in the East: Considering a Move Away from Orthodoxy,

9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 255, 279 (1990). Abrams, supra note 81, at 279.
197RRMWC § 4R-2-01(2). See also RRMWC § IR-l-04 (comprehensive planning also
includes developing drought management strategies). See also Lawrence J. MacDonnell,
Sustainable Use of Water Resources, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 97 (1997)
(discussing specific ways that a sustainable development concept might be implemented
in water resource management, e.g., taking "the minimum amount necessary to
accomplish the purpose," id. at 99 (requiring new buildings to have efficient water
fixtures and retrofitting old buildings, mandating efficient practices for new irrigation,
and charging fees for withdrawal of water).
198 There is already a considerable effort in the United States on conserving water. See
generally Robert E. Beck, The Uses of and Demands for Water, in 1 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS §§ 2.02, 2.03 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).
' There are instances where conservation has allowed a community to forego the greater
expense of constructing a new reservoir. For example an Oregon town opted to use
conservation measures instead of building a second reservoir at a cost of $.70 per cubic
foot versus $2.80 per cubic foot for the reservoir. Oregon Town Kills Dam With Water
Conservation, U.S. WATER NEWS, July 1996, at 17. The four conservation measures
relied upon were: (1) leak detection and repair; (2) lower flow showerheads; (3) low flow
toilets; and (4) higher rates for gallons used in excess of the base amount. Id. See also

Robert E. Beck, The Uses of and Demandsfor Water, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 2.02, at 24 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999) (discussing Denver and the Two
Forks dam).
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"The State shall conserve the waters of the State through suitable
policies and by encouraging private efforts to conserve water and to avoid
waste." 2" First, the Code requires a permittee to have a "reasonable plan
for conservation," 21 which is defined as a detailed plan "describing and
quantifying the amount and use of water to be developed by conservation
measures in the exercise of a water right. '212 Conservation measures are
measures adopted by a water right holder, or a group of holders pursuant
to a conservation agreement,2 3 to reduce withdrawals or consumptive
uses, or both.2 ' The Code then provides a list of examples; improving
water transmission and water use efficiency, reducing water use,
enhancing return flows, and reusing return flows. 205 If the holder applies
to modify2°6 the permit, the agency can require a new plan for
conservation. 207
Second, the Code puts a duty on the state's allocation agency to
encourage voluntary actions to conserve water in two different ways. 08
The first way is to provide as much technical assistance as the agency's
resources allow to holders of water rights, to aid them in developing or
implementing conservation measures in addition to those required by the
Code. 209 The second way is to create an information program, in or out of
school, to educate the public about the State's water policies and the steps
necessary to respond to a water shortage or water emergency.210
As an incentive for additional conservation, the Code provides
preferences for a water right holder who puts in place conservation
measures beyond those required by the Code or by the permit and that
2oo

RRMWC § IR-I-10.
While RRMWC § 6R-2-01(l)(p) merely requires a permit application to describe "any
plan for conservation the applicant proposes to follow," RRMWC § 6R-3-01(l)(d)
provides that the agency can issue a permit "only upon determining that both preexisting
withdrawals and uses if there are any" and the proposed withdrawal and use "incorporate
a reasonable plan for conservation."
201

RRMWC § 2R-2-17.
203 Id. § 7R-3-06(3)-(5) (describing such agreements).
202

" Id. § 2R-2-05. The reference in the black letter to RRMWC § 7R-3-05 should be to

RRMWC § 7R-3-06.
20.Id.

§ 2R-2-05(a)-(d). See generally Robert E. Beck, The Uses of and Demands for
§§ 2.02, 2.03 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 &
1999).
2Supp.
6
Water, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS

" See infra text accompanying notes 379-393 for a discussion of modification.

207 RRMWC
208

§ 7R-2-02(2).

Id. § 9R-l-01.

2

'Id. § 9R-1-01(a).

2 ° Id. § 9R-1-01(b).
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meet certain conditions.2" ' The measures must result in "significant
quantifiable reductions ' in water that has been used in times other than
during a water shortage or water emergency.213 The holder is entitled to a
modification of the permit to allow the use of the saved water in other
locations or for other purposes in preference to others who might apply.214
Even if the person conserving water has no alternate use for the water
conserved and is unable to find a buyer for it, the person conserving
should still benefit if the recommendation of the Code has been followed
to charge a fair amount for the water itself, for the person conserving could
then save the excess that has been paid for that larger amount of water.
However, the holder still has the burden to show that the modification will
not unreasonably injure other holders of water rights, the public interest or
the sustainable development of the waters of the State.21 5
The following simple hypothetical illustrates what appear to be the
options under the Code. Suppose that A is using a technique that
consumes fifty units of water per day, for which A has a permit. A pays
$1 per unit for the water and $.25 per unit for delivery of the water. A
develops a technique that reduces the requirement to twenty-five units per
day. There is no water shortage or emergency. A has not been wasting
water as his former technology was the accepted technology. A would
appear to have three options: (1) A could reduce withdrawal and
consumption to twenty-five units. A would save having to pay for the
other twenty-five units plus any associated reduction in delivery costs; (2)
A could "sell and assign" the twenty-five now excess units to B for the
balance of the permit term assuming that there is a B around. When
registered, B would pay the agency directly for the twenty-five units and A
would be off the hook for paying the agency and pocket the sales price. B
would then have to arrange for delivery. A would also benefit in any
associated reduction in delivery price of delivering the remaining twentyfive units; (3) A could double production capacity and use the newly freed
211

Id. § 9R-1-02.

Measuring water can present a problem. See, e.g., the discussions in Owen L.
Anderson and Pauline M. Simmons, Reallocation, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §
212

16.02(c), at 277-282 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999); e.g., C. Peter Goplerud,
The Permit Process and Colorado's Exception, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
14.03(c)(1) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).

§

RRMWC § 9R-1-02(l). Abrams points out the importance of rewarding water
developers who make water available that otherwise would not be available. See
Abrams, supra note 81, at 280. 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 255, 280 (1990).
213

214

15

RRMWC § 9R-1-02(1).
Id. § 9R-1-02(2).
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twenty-five units for the new production for the balance of the permit
term.
Under the Code, the first option would be implemented essentially
mechanically. There are no hitches. Under the second option, there would
be a Code issue of the reasonableness of the use that B would put the
water to and an issue of any unreasonable effect on any other current user,
which could come about by changing the withdrawal point to a location
upstream. Under the third option, there may be a Code issue of the
reasonableness of using the water to double A's production output, but no
other issue. If A is ambivalent, A has in theory up to five years under the
forfeiture provision to decide what to do, although the length of the
unexpired permit term may affect this time period." 6
Conservation measures will not save water for a holder that the
holder has been wasting2t 7 or that has become subject to forfeiture.2"'
Difficulties have arisen in prior appropriation states because of the failure
of those systems to establish in advance the relationship between
"salvage" and "waste." 9 Thus it is important for the Code
to discuss as it
does220 how conservation measures should be treated in the context of the
waste doctrine. The Code explores this relationship at several places in
the Commentary and while defining a borderline may still be difficult, this
express treatment of the problem should avoid the general confusion that
arose in the west.22 '
The Code also promotes conservation by providing for
"conservation credits."22 First, when a water user complies
with measures
in the plan of conservation, that water user is not to be cut back further
216

The question would arise as to whether during this waiting period when A would not

be taking the extra twenty-five units, would A be paying either for the water or its
delivery. Perhaps this would depend on what the permit says as to the former and any

delivery contract A may have as to the latter.
217

Id. § 2R-2-27 defines "waste of water" as "causing, suffering, or permitting the

consumption or use of the waters of the State for a purpose or in a manner that is not

reasonable."
218 Id. § 9R-1-02(3). Forfeiture is provided for
in RRMWC § 7R-1-03. See infra text
accompanying notes 373-378.
219 Robert E. Beck, Prevalence and Definition, in 2 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS §
12.03(c)(2) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).

RRMWC at 335-36.
221 Id.
220

Id. § 7R-3-06. Abrams points out that rewarding water developers who make water
available that was not otherwise available is important. See Abrams, supra note 81, at
222

280.
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during a water shortage or water emergency "until other permit holders
shall have achieved comparable restrictions. '223 Second, when a water
user undertakes voluntary conservation measures during a shortage or
emergency and the measures result in "significant quantifiable reductions"
in the amount being used before the crisis began, the user is to have a
credit against reductions pursuant to any shortage or emergency scheme
imposed by the agency.224 Third, a written agreement among water users
to undertake joint conservation measures will give those users a credit for
"any water actually conserved" against reductions adopted by the agency
for any shortage or emergency, although the Code distinguishes between
agreements entered into before the shortage or emergency arises 225 and
agreements entered into after the shortage or emergency arises.226
A problem with both environmental and economic consequences
arose under prior appropriation doctrine when the use of the water was not
limited to the watershed in which it originated. The classic example is the
Owens Valley in California, where the water was withdrawn and removed
to Los Angeles. 227 The standard response in the West has been to provide
for some measure of "area of origin" protection. 28 Butler reviews
equitable concerns from three perspectives; (1) water-rich areas, (2)
current water users, and (3) water-poor areas.229 In water-rich areas she
finds that people tend to feel the water belongs to them regardless of
whether the law recognizes that ownership. After all, they have to live
with swamps and other problems of excess water, so they should have the
benefits of the excess water, especially since they often chose to live in
such areas because of the richness of the water resources.230 She suggests
several possible options to meet their equitable claim; (1) determining
priority of water use, (2) requiring consent to transfer water resources, (3)
discerning the impact of any such transfer on their future, (4) paying a
reasonable fee to the area, and (5) periodically reevaluating any water
As to water-poor areas, she contends that if parts of the state
transfer.'
223 RRMWC § 7R-3-06(1).

§ 7R-3-06(2).
2251d. § 7R-3-06(3).
226Id. § 7R-3-06(4).
224Id.

227

See Owen L. Anderson and Pauline M. Simmons, Reallocation, in 2 WATERS

WATER RIGHTS § 16.02(c)(2) n.314 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).

2 See generally, id. § 16.02(c)(2).

2 Butler, supra note 123, at 461-467.
230 Id. at 461-63.
231

Id.at 462-3
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differ in richness of water resources, the state should allow some
reallocation to the water-poor area;232 but it is not clear why the people in
the area have any equitable claim to it. If we rely on the expectations of
persons in water-rich areas of benefiting from the richness, what would the
expectations of someone in a water-poor area be? Why would they have
an expectation of being provided with water from a water-rich area?
Perhaps if we have a situation where water in an area is serving no useful
purpose whatever, we could ask what reason would justify denying it to
the water-poor area. That might be the one clear case of claim, but
otherwise the equitable claims of water-poor areas seems questionable.
The Code allows the removal of water from the watershed 233 but
includes protection for "the reasonable needs" of the "water basins23 4 of
origin.''235 The protection is to be accomplished through the regulation of
interbasin transfers. 236 Two specific points in the regulation of interbasin
transfers are (1) special standards for interbasin transfers 237 which include
a compensation fee to be paid into an Interbasin Compensation Fund (ICF)
to compensate the basin for generalized losses238 and (2) a requirement that
the permit reflect any withdrawal fee to be paid into the ICF.23 9
The Owens Valley problem exists whether transfer from one
watershed to another is within a single state or from one state to another.
The latter situation is complicated by the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,240 where the
court found groundwater to be an article in commerce and state action and
therefore subject to the restraints of the negative commerce clause.241

232

Id. at 466.

233

RRMWC § 2R-1-02.
A water basin is referred to as the area from which all waters drain on or below the

234

ground to a common point. RRMWC § 2R-2-28(l).

The applicable basin is to be

determined by measuring to "the lowest point relevant to the issue to be determined." Id.

§ 2R-2-28(2).
235 RRMWC § 1R-l-14.
236 Id.
Interbasin transfer is defimed in RRMWC § 2R-2-10.
237
Id.§ 6R-3-06.
23 Id. § 6R-3-06(3).
239

Id. § 7R-1-01(k).

458 U.S. 941 (1982). See generally Douglas L. Grant, State Regulation of Interstate
Water Export, in 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 48.03 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1996 &
Supp. 1999).
24 See Grant, supra note 240, at § 48.03(a).
240
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Professor Abrams242 suggests that state statutes are not going to
provide guidance on out of state transfers.243 However, state statutes are
free to do so under U.S. Supreme Court decisions, 244 and the Code
contains such provisions.2"5 The Code recognizes that transport and use of
water out of state can be consistent with the source state's public interest
and with sustainable development of the waters of the source state.246
However, the Code requires a permit for transport out of state 247 except
when the transport is in closed containers or when the water is for the
domestic use of the transporters. 248 Filing of an application for this permit
is treated as consenting to comply with the source state's laws governing
allocation and use of water.249 The applicant is required to designate an
agent within the source state for service of process and receipt of legal
notices.25° That agent has to be maintained during processing of the
application and, if a permit is issued, as long thereafter as the permit
remains in effect.25 '
The agency is to issue a permit if six specified findings are made.
The first is that the proposed withdrawal, transportation and use are
reasonable. 2 The considerations for determining reasonableness fall into
two categories; (1) the same considerations that are used to determine
reasonableness under an in-state permit application 253 and (2) special
24

Abrams, supra note 81, at 276.

Id. at 276-77. He discusses North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428 (E.D.N.C.
1987), to illustrate. North Carolina was seeking to stop the transportation of water from
Lake Gaston, North Carolina, to City of Virginia Beach, Virginia. North Carolina's
statute applies only to designated capacity use areas; the area involved in the case was
not so designated so the statute did not apply. Moreover, Abrams points out that there
would not have been any guidance in that statute for this type of multi-jurisdictional
transfer case anyway.
244 See generally Douglas L. Grant. State Regulation of Interstate Water Export, in 4
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 48.03(a)(2) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1996 & Supp. 1999).
2 s RRMWC ch.
VIII.
246 Id. § 8R-1-01. Probably
a necessary requirement because of Sporhase. See supra note
240 and accompanying text.
243

247 RRMWC.
248

§ 8R-1-02(l), (2).
Id. § 8R-1-02(3).

249 Id.

§ 8R-1-03.
Id. § 8R-1-04(1). However in default of appointment, the Code designates the source
state's Secretary of State to serve in that capacity. RRMWC § 8R-1-04(2), (3).
25! RRMWC § 8R-1-04(1).
250

...
Id. § 8R-1-05(i)(a).

Id. § 8R-1-05(2). These are incorporated by reference and located at RRMWC §§ 6R3-01 to 6R-3-06. See infra text accompanying notes 304-323 for discussion of
reasonableness.
253
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There are three special
considerations: (1) the supplies of water available to the users of each state
within their respective states; 255 (2) the overall water demand in the two
states; 256 (3) the probable impact of the transportation and use on existing
or foreseeable shortages in either state.257
In addition, before approving a permit the agency must find that
the withdrawal, transportation, and use of the water: (1) will not impair
existing water rights under the Code; 258 (2) is not detrimental to the
conservation and sustainable development of waters within the source
state; 259 (3) is not otherwise detrimental to the health, safety, or general
welfare of the people of the source state; 26 (4) is consistent with the
obligations of the source state under federal law, including interstate
compacts and international agreements; 261 and (5) is otherwise consistent
with the public interest.262
The Code requires the agency to include terms and conditions in
the permit, in addition to those included in ordinary withdrawal and use
permits, that will insure that the use of the water in the other state does not
impair existing uses in the source state and is consistent with sustainable
development of the waters and with laws and regulations of the state in
which the water is going to be used. 263 Finally, the Code provides that
nothing in the out-of-state transport chapter impairs the authority of the
source state to (1) do comprehensive water planning,2" (2) itself allocate
and/or export large quantities of water,265 (3) regulate water marketing,266
(4) enter into water allocation compacts with other states,267 and (5) restrict
interstate water uses in connection with equitable apportionment,

RRMWC § 8R- 1-05(2)(a)-(c).
§ 8R-l-05(2)(a).

214

255 Id.
256

Id. § 8R-1-05(2)(b).

" Id. § 8R-1-05(2)(c)
Id. § 8R-1-05(l)(b).
259 Id. § 8R-1-05(1)(c).
26 RRMWC § 8R-1-05(1)(d).
258

261
262

263

2

Id. § 8R-1-05(1)(e).
Id. § 8R-I-05(l)(f).
Id. § 8R- 1-06.

Id. §8R-1-07(a). See infra Part V of this article.

265 RRMWC § 8R-1-07(b).
266 Id.
267

§ 8R-1-07(c).
Id. § 8R-1-07(d).
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requirements of federal law or regulations, interstate compacts, or
international agreements.26
While the foregoing discussion indicates many ways in which
ecological and environmental concerns are taken into account under the
Code, Professor Butler nevertheless insists that "the public interest needs
'
to be recognized as a property right."269
Her discussion of environmental
water rights and the idea of public property 7 ° is in the context of a quest
for the appropriate dispute resolution standard to be used when these
public interest manifestations come in conflict with private rights acquired
under the allocation system established for water resources in the
particular jurisdiction.
Certainly the public servitude for navigation has been quite useful
in protecting and promoting navigation.27 How close does the Code come
to doing what Butler wants? Although the Code declares public ownership
of water, its definition of the public interest that this ownership reflects is
broader than promotion of ecological or environmental value, and the
power to regulate withdrawal and use is couched in traditional police
power terms.
Hopefully, however, the Code's establishment of
environmental and ecological needs as a baseline below which water
cannot be withdrawn (and therefore not allocated) serves the same goal.
Certainly the Code contains much more than the vague standards and
secondary status that were the primary problems with the previous law.272
The point of potential conflict between a private user and the public
interest can be considered further at the end of Part V of this article which
deals with the scope of the private water user's rights under the Code.
Ultimately the status either of the public interest or public property
is only as good as the protectors of the status.273 Many public parks have
268

269

Id. § 8R-1-07(e).
Butler, supra note 119, at 326. See supra text accompanying notes 136-138. See also

A. Dan Tarlock, The EndangeredSpecies Act and Western Water Rights, 20 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 1 (1985) (discussing the concept of "regulatory property rights" and

integrating water for endangered species into the western beneficial use concept).
270
271

Butler, supra note 119 at 351-376.
See Harrison C. Dunning, Sources of the Public Right, in 4

RIGHTS
§ 30.05 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1996 & Supp.
22 See supra
text accompanying notes 129-135.

273

WATERS AND WATER

1999).

Butler discusses who this ought to be in terms of the type of the public agency that is

in charge. For example, she points out that a two-tiered system would diffuse decisionmaking and, therefore, help avoid inherent bias, whether urban versus rural or some
other. Butler, supra note 123, at 446. Further, she points out that policymakers need to
be democratically accountable. Id. at 459-60.

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.

& POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 25:113

been invaded with super highways or other intrusions when it was seen as
costing fewer dollars to a build a road through the park rather than through
a developed part of town.274 Montgomery Ward, while he was alive,
brought several lawsuits to protect Grant Park on the Lake Michigan
waterfront from encroachment by buildings.275 To further such protection,
the Code contains an optional citizen suit provision276 which should be
adopted in some form.
IV. THE SCOPE AND ROLE OF PRIVATE RIGHTS DELINEATED IN THE CODE

Professor Robert Abrams, after reviewing perceived deficiencies in
common law and statutory riparianism,277 put forth as one of his three
major goals for any riparian permit system to "add concreteness and
predictability to the rights of permit-holding water users without being
27 If economic growth is
overly confining and unnecessarily burdensome.""
279
a part of the public interest in water,
it requires some measure of
certainty for those who need to use water in their enterprise. However, to
manage water from a watershed perspective requires flexibility and,
particularly, the ability to regulate private use.280 Clearly one major
criticism about the common law riparian scheme was the uncertainty
associated with what was at most a usufructuary right. 21 Water users are

See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
City of Chicago v. Ward, 48 N.E. 927 (Ill. 1897); Bliss v. Ward, 64 N.E. 705 (Ill.
1902); Ward v. Field Museum 89 N.E. 731 (Ill. 1909).
2
274
275

76

7

RRMWC § 5R-4-09.

.. Abrams, supra note 81, at 257-70. 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 255, 257-270 (1990).
278 Id. at 284. See infra notes 463, 474 for the other two major goals.
179See supra text accompanying notes 147-149.
280
Tarlock, supra notel45
281
Although the right to flowing water is incident to the title to land, there
is no right of property in such water in the sense that it can be the
subject of exclusive appropriation and dominion. The only property
interest in it is usufructuary. The right of each riparian is to have the
natural flow of the stream come to his land and to make a reasonable
and just use of the water on its course through his land, subject,
however, to the like right of each upper proprietor to make a reasonable
and just use of the water in its course through his land and further
subject to the obligation to lower proprietors to permit the water to pass
away from his estate unaffected except by such consequences as follow
from reasonable and just use by him.
Stratton v. Mount Hermon Boys' School, 103 N.E. 87, 87-88 (Mass. 1913).
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concerned with the certainty of their supplies.2". Concerns about certainty
become very real when projects that would require large amounts of water
are under consideration. For example, in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
when the idea of a coal slurry pipeline283 extending from Illinois to Florida
was under consideration,2"4 legitimate questions included where the water
would come from and who would have authority to supply it for the thirty
years or whatever period the lending institution would require in order to
protect its investment. Additional uncertainty existed regarding municipal
water supplies, as municipalities as a whole were generally not considered
to be riparian even if the city bordered a body of water.285
However, providing certainty raises questions about destroying
flexibility. The existence of firm long-lasting private rights can hinder
changes in water use necessary to reflect current public interest values.
Indeed, Professor Tarlock asks whether private property in water is
consistent with a watershed management approach.286
The Code seeks to achieve a compromise between certainty and
flexibility with two basic provisions. The first provision says that "[iun
order to provide legal security for water rights within the constraints
provided in this Code, this Code establishes a system of permits28 7 that
288
make a water right a matter of legal record entitled to legal protection.
The second provision says that "in order to attain contemporary economic,
environmental, and other social goals, the State shall encourage and enable
the sale or other voluntary modification of water rights subject to the
protection of third parties and the public interest."2" 9 While these
provisions provide a counterpoint to each other, they also contain
limitations within themselves. What are the "constraints" on private rights
provided in the Code? What is the "protection" for third parties and for
the public interest?
282
283

See Abrams, supra note 277, at 258-59 ("debilitating unpredictability").
Coal would be crushed and mixed with water and the slurry would be shipped through

a pipeline. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, A TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT OF
COAL SLURRY PIPELINES 27-29 (1978).
284 See William F. Webber, Coal Slurry Pipelines are Ready, Willing, and Unable to Get
There, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 765, 766-67 (1980).
285 See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water Under "Pure" Riparian

Rights, in I

WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS

§ 7.05(c)(1) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 &

Supp.
1999). See generallyButler, supra note 28, at 95.
286Tarlock,
supra note 145.
27

See infra text accompanying notes 290-323 for discussion of this system.
RRMWC § IR- 1-06 (emphasis added).
289
Id. § 1R-1-07 (emphasis added).
288
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The Code affirmatively recognizes that a person who acquires a
permit under the Code to withdraw water from waters of the state has a
" ' Withdrawal is defined
water right29 which denotes a protected interest.29
as removal of water from the source or exercise of physical control over
the water.292 While the water right comes subject to many conditions,293 to
acquire the water right in the first instance requires going through a
rigorous permit application process294 that involves a balancing of
interests. The agency is to issue a permit only when it determines that the
proposed use is reasonable29 and that the proposed withdrawal and use (1)
does not exceed the safe yield296 of the source when combined with present
uses, 297 (2) is consistent with any comprehensive water allocation plan29
and drought management strategies 2 " that exist, 3°° (3) does incorporate a
reasonable plan for conservation,3"' and (4) is consistent with the Code and
any order, term, condition, or regulation promulgated under or pursuant to

290 RRMWC

ch. VI is entitled "Establishing a Water Right." Water right is defined as "a

right to withdraw a certain portion of the waters of the State in compliance with the
provisions of this Code, whether subject to a permit or otherwise." RRMWC § 2R-2-30.
29' While RRMWC § 5R-l-01 declares a right to a hearing to persons "aggrieved" by
agency orders or decisions and to persons with an interest in fact "likely to be affected
adversely by a regulation," it imposes a strict timetable to activate the process. A written
request for a hearing must be made within thirty days of receipt of notice for the order or
decision and within sixty days of the publication of the proposed or promulgated rule.
Id. And the agency must provide the hearing within thirty days of receipt of the request.
RRMWC § 5R-1-03 refers to both the county in which the withdrawal occurs and to the
county where the water is used. How to choose where to hold the hearing is clarified in
the Commentary. RRMWC at 160. Once a hearing is held anyone who has and interest
in fact can participate in the hearing. RRMWC § 5R-1-03(2).
292 See
293

RRMWC § 2R-2-34.

See infra text accompanying notes 362-426.
294 Some withdrawals may not require a permit. See RRMWC § 6R-1-02 ("small
withdrawals.") The section as drafted includes a less than 100,000 gal. per day
withdrawal
295RRMWCexclusion. Id. § 6R-1-02(1). See infra text accompanying notes 327-329.
§ 6R-3-01(l)(a). See infra text accompanying notes 305-320.
29' Safe yield is defined in RRMWC § 2R-2-21. See supra text accompanying notes 180182.
297

RRMWC § 6R-3-01(l)(b).

Defined at RRMWC § 2R-2-04. See infra Part V of this article.
at RRMWC § 2R-2-09. See infra text accompanying notes 394-426.
0 RRMWC § 6R-3-01(1)(c).
301 Id. § 6R-3-01(l)(d). See supra text accompanying notes 201-207.
298

299 Defined

2000)

THE REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE

the Code or any other water use statute.302 Any person challenging the
33

agency's determination has the burden of proof.
The approach the Code takes toward determining reasonable use is
to list eight specific factors for the agency to consider,3" followed by a
catchall "any other relevant factors.""3 5 According to the commentary in
the Code, these factors reflect both "social utility or value" of the proposed
use on its own and the "relative value" of the proposed use in comparison
to other existing or planned uses.3" 6 This, of course, is what many courts
have done in determining reasonable use under common law riparianism3 °7
and what is reflected in the Restatement.30 8 Recreation and aesthetic uses
do not necessarily involve either removing water from a source or
exercisiIng physical control 3°9 over the water.310 However, if these uses
exist and are reasonable, when someone applies to withdraw or physically
control water, the impact of the withdrawal or control on those uses has to
be considered by the agency.3 1 Thus, the principal effect of regulated
riparianism under the Code initially appears to completely shift the initial
determination of reasonableness from a court to the agency. A riparian
use that would destroy_ the water source would be unreasonable.
Cumulative riparian uses that would destroy the water source similarly
would be unreasonable. That these limitations are reflected in legislation
and administered through an agency rather than in the common law and
through a court should not raise any significant constitutional issues.3"
3D2

303

RRMWC § 6R-3-01(l)(e).
Id. § 6R-3-01(2). The Code provides for hearings and judicial review. RRMWC §§

5R-1-01 to 5R-1-05 (hearings); RRMWC §§ 5R-3-01 to 5R-3-03 (judicial review). The

Code also contains provisions on dispute resolution designed to "encourage a wider
range of informal dispute resolution for all disputes involving the waters of the State and
requires arbitration for disputes between permit holders." RRMWC at 164. RRMWC §
5R-2-03 on arbitration applies, therefore, only to situations where all disputants are
permit holders. Thus a dispute between a permit holder and a nonpermit holder, or
between two nonpermit holders, would not come under the section.

" RRMWC § 6R-3-02(a)-(h).
Id. § 6R-3-02(i).
31 Id.
at 241. See the definition of unreasonable injury in RRMWC § 2R-2-26.
305

30" Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water Under 'Pure' RiparianRights, in
1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.02(d)(2), (d)(3) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp.

1999).
308

3
30

RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 850A (1977).

See supra text accompanying note 302.
See Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1955).
311 RRMWC § 6R-3-02(a)-(i).
312 See infra text accompanying notes 475-483.
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A new riparian user may have an expectation of being able to use
at least some of the water. A nonriparian who applies may not have any
such expectation. Because of the protection that the Code accords a prior
permittee, and because the availability of any water is a factor to be taken
into account in granting a permit, t ' not all riparians will necessarily be

able to make a consumptive use of the water. When a new application
comes in, it may request an amount that would exceed safe: yield, thus
requiring that the agency deny the application in part or in whole. The
denial protects users at the time of the application a" 4 and the public interest
in minimum flows or levels, because neither would appear to have to yield
to accommodate even a new riparian user. Under this analysis the riparian
might argue that the riparian right to future use has been taken. 5
The Code makes it clear that in measuring the impact of a
proposed new use on an existing permittee, the agency is to apply the
reasonable use rule and determine whether the new use would
"unreasonably" interfere with the existing use.36 Unreasonable injury is
31 7
defined in terms of balancing "social utility" and "costs imposed." '
Thus, under the Code a prior permittee would not have absolute protection
any more than a prior riparian user under common law riparian doctrine
would get absolute protection against a subsequent riparian user. This
definition appears to preserve the basic substantive common law approach
to riparian doctrine."' This potential conflict between, and perhaps excess
withdrawal by, two riparians would require vigilance to protect the
minimum flow or level. There could be a tendency for both to continue

313

RRMWC § 6R-3-02(b).

314
When

there is a permit application, the Code calls for notice and a hearing and persons
who claim that their pre-existing use will be affected can develop that point in comments
or at a hearing. RRMWC §§ 6R-2-02, 6R-2-04.
311 See Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Resources Bd., 855 P.2d
568
(Okla. 1993). Most courts considering the issue have classified any right to make a future
use as inchoate rather than vested with the result that there is no taking. See Joseph W.
Dellapenna, Dual Systems, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 8.03(b)(1) (Robert E.
Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999). Butler points out that regardless of legal doctrine, there
can
still be an issue of fairness. See Butler, supra note 123, at 463-64.
316 RRMWC
§ 6R-3-02(d). A permit can only be issued for a reasonable use which means
"without unreasonable injury to other water rights holders." RRMWC § 2R-2-20.
317
RRMWC § 2R-2-26.
3' In contrast with the technical limitation that limits use of water to abutting land, which
is specifically eliminated by the Code. RRMWC § 2R-1-02 See supra text
accompanying notes 233-239.

2000]

0THE REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE

149

withdrawing water to the extent permitted as long as there is any water left
in the source.
Under common law riparianism, all riparians have a correlative
right and, in theory, if all existing users have been using all of the water,
when a new user comes on line, the old users will need to accommodate
the new user. However, there were exceptions., The common law
recognized prescriptive rights which might limit a new user,3" 9 and some
scholars suggest that courts gave preference to earlier users over later
users,32 causing the Restatement to list it as an element. 321 Early statutes
intervened in terms of preferences for certain uses,322 and finally, the
common law favored domestic (natural) users over "artificial" users.323
Perhaps under the Code, preference for an earlier permittee will be
analogous to one or more of these doctrines and not considered violative
of a right to make a future use, assuming the state has recognized such a
right.
Under the Code it is unlawful for anyone who is not specifically
324
exempted to withdraw water from waters of the state without a permit.
As noted earlier,325 withdrawal is defined as removal of water from the
source or exercise of physical control over the water. 326 The Code exempts
withdrawals of less than 100,000 gallons per day from the permit
requirement 27 but points out in the commentary -that the particular figure
is not sacrosanct.328 Persons who are exempted from the requirement of
39 Dellapenna, supra note 319. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.04(c) (Robert E.

Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).
3120See generally Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of CommonLaw Water Rights, 19 J.LEGAL STUD.261 (1990).
32,
"[T]he protection for existing values of water uses, land, investments and enterprises."
Restatement [Second] Torts §850A(h).
322

See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water Under "Pure" Riparian

AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.04(c) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp.
1999). See also Joseph W. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, in I WATERS AND

Rights, in 1 WATERS
WATER RIGHTS §

9.02 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).

, Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Ill. 492,495 (1842).
324
RRMWC §6R- 1-01.
325 See supra text
326 RRVWC
327
321

accompanying note 292.

§ 2R-2-34.

Id. § 6R-1-02(1).
Id. at 207. The impact of the cumulative small withdrawals cannot be overemphasized.

New Mexico had to put new domestic well permits on hold because of the total amount

of water for 60,000 to 80,000 such wells with each being able to take up to three acrefeet. The 1,000,000 gallons so being withdrawn was having an undue effect on fully
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having a permit can nonetheless apply for and obtain a permit like anyone
else.329
Richard Ausness,3 30 after identifying and describing the then
existent legislation in fourteen eastern states, concludes that "water
legislation should create no exempted use category."33 ' Instead, he
recommends giving the agency criteria with which to grant exemptions
based on water quantity rather than class of use, together with the
authority to revise the criteria and regulate all users during an
emergency.332 The Code follows this advice. It does not exclude any class
of use from application of the Code.333 With the 100,000 gallon limit ...
the Code recognizes in the commentary that the legislature could use the
approach of giving authority to the agency to define the exemptions.33
Nor does the Code exempt users who are using water at the time
that the Code takes effect from the permit requirement. The Code will
only protect existing users, 336 and even they must apply for a permit within
one year from the effective date of the Code.337 They are allowed to
continue the existing withdrawal until the agency acts on the permit
application.33 The agency is to approve the permit application for the
appropriated streams. Domestic Well Permits on Hold in New Mexico, U.S. WATER
NEWS, July 1996, at 16.
329 RRMWC § 6R-1-02(3). The advantage of doing this is that their "water right" will be
a matter of record,
330
3

Ausness, supra note 45, at 578.
Id. at 579. Ausness calls for one state agency to be in charge of planning. Because the

Code recognizes the option in the state not to adopt a statewide permit system, it does
provide for the possibility of a local or regional agency to issue permits when no statewide permit system is in place. RRMWC ch. IV, pt. 4. Abrams considers state-wide
permits as unnecessary in at least some states. See Abrams, supra note 81, at 257 (there
are ways to advance desired objectives outside of a comprehensive permit system "some
of which are at variance with the standard comprehensive permit systems that have thus
far emerged as the models. In this way, the article advocates a move away from
orthodoxy."). General planning for water resource management and use could still take
place on the state level.
332

Ausness, supra note 330, at 578-79.

333RRMWC §lR-1-02.
334See supra text accompanying

notes 324-329.
at 209.
336 Those withdrawals being made on the effective date of the Code or made
on a regular
basis within the 12 months immediately before the effective date of the Code. RRMWC §
6R-1-03(l).
31 Id. § 6R- 1-03(2). Failure to apply constitutes abandonment of the right. RRMWC §
6R1-03(6).
331RRMWC
§ 6R-1-03(3).
3

1 RRMWC
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amount "reasonably necessary" for the purpose for which the withdrawal
was being made.339 If all existing withdrawals taken together exceed safe
yield, the agency has to allocate the safe yield among those users based on
the standards set out for new permits. 40 An allocation where a preexisting use does not get the entire pre-Code amount may lead to a takings
claim.34 Butler discusses the equity of current user claims, noting that
even though legal doctrine may not entitle them to compensation, there are
still fairness concerns.342 Water right holders' concerns that they will be
deprived of valuable rights may lead them to oppose reforms to the water
management system.343 Therefore she recommends considering (1) giving
permits of equal value even if standards need to be eased, (2) paying for
any loss in value, or (3) grand-fathering existing uses.3" She finds the first
two recommendations preferable because they will integrate the water into
45
the new system.
Professor Robert Abrams, in examining common law riparian
doctrine and existing statutory schemes, concluded that a state-wide
permit system was not necessarily the optimum approach to dealing with
existent problems.3 4 If, for example, there are areas with ample water
resources, it would save both time and money not to regulate or at least not
to regulate through a permit system in those areas.34 7 However, if these
ample resources are to be shared with other parts of the state, as Professor
Butler suggests,3 4' having both areas under the system -may make better
sense. Abrams identified and discussed two cases about which he
concluded that a permit system would not have served well in either case,

319
Id. § 6R-1-03(4).

Id. § 6R-1-03(5).
341
See infra text accompanying notes 477-483.
342 See Butler, supra note 123, at 464.
340

143Id. at

463.

344Id. at

464.

Id.
" See Robert H. Abrams, supra note 277, at 255. He discusses the pros and cons of a
comprehensive permit system. The pros include: (1) preventing overuse, to extent first
come is there; (2) quantification of the extent of the right, to the extent permits are not
issued unless water is available; and (3) allows acting before a crisis arises. Id. at 262-64.
The cons include the (1) monetary cost of system and (2) resulting inefficiencies. Id. at
264-65. The conclusion that a state-wide permit system is not necessarily the optimal
approach is the result of a balancing between these pros and cons.
141 Cost may be a significant factor in deciding whether to enact reform legislation. Id. at
261-265.
148Butler, supra note 123, at 466-467.
345
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because it either would have been too cumbersome or would not have
provided any guidance to the agency.349
In the first case,350 numerous small farmers sued a big well
owner/operator for an injunction and damages.35 ' The statute had been
enacted solely to deal. with well interference problems; it allowed the state
agency to order cessation of pumping when the withdrawal caused
qualifying wells to cease functioning. The state had set the lqualifications
in terms of "generally accepted standards of. well construction in the
industry. '352 The complainants' wells did not qualify and, therefore, the
statute did not help them. Abrams sees this type of problem as being dealt
with effectively without the expense of a permit system. The expense
would be borne both by the state, from running the system, and by water
users, from having to comply with it.353
Even though some water users will be exempt from having to
apply for a permit under the Code, they are covered by several general
principles in the Code that apply to all who withdraw or physically control
water. First, "[n]o person shall make any use of the waters of the state
except in so far as the use is reasonable as determined pursuant to this
'
Code."354
Second, "[n]o person using the waters of the State shall cause
unreasonable injury to other water uses made pursuant to valid water
rights, regardless of whether the injury relates to the quality or the quantity
'
impacts of the activity causing the injury."355
Third, "[e]very person
exercising a water right pursuant to this Code is required to protect the
'
prescribed minimum flows or levels when exercising such right."356
Fourth, all who withdraw water from a source are subject to water
shortage and emergency orders.357
""See Abrams, supra note 277, at 265.
0 See supra note 243 for a discussion of the second case.
...
Prohosky v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 584. F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ind.
1984). The discussion begins at Abrams, supra note 277, at 271.
352 Abrams, supra note 277, at 272.
313Id. at 274.
14 RRMWC § 2R-2-01. The Commentary to RRMWC § 2R-1-01 reads: "All uses of
water, including those not required to have a permit or an allocation, must be
'reasonable' as defined in this Code." Id. at 26.
3 RRMWC § 2R-1-03.
356
Id. § 3R-2-01(2).
157 Id. § 7R-3-05(l). RMMWC § 6R-1-02(2) refers only to emergencies
but this appears
to be a typo because of the clear reference in the commentary to both shortages and
emergencies. RRMWC at 209. Furthermore, RRMWC § 7R-3-05(1) makes application
to both shortages and emergencies clear.
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Once a water user has acquired a water right and the public interest
has been established, the two principal threats are new users coming on
line and a drought. Therefore, the consequence to the existing user in
each case is important. The problem of new users coming on line has
already been explored.35 To explore further the scope of the basic right
acquired by permit under the Code and to consider the drought aspect, I
will, divide-the following discussion into three aspects; permit terms,
modification of the water right, and drought management.359 It may be that
in some watersheds, perhaps many, the result should be as Professor
Tarlock discusses with reference to the Great Lakes,3" that no further
withdrawals should be allowed. Then the important provisions of the
Code would be 36those dealing with modification of existing uses of
withdrawn water. '
A. Permit Terms
Richard Ausness in Water Rights Legislation in the East: A
Programfor Reform, 36 2 after identifying and describing the then existent
legislation in fourteen eastern states, discussed permit terms in the context
of reallocation, viewing short-term 363 and variable-term permits 3" as
devices for reallocation. He noted Iowa legislation that provided for ten
year terms and Florida legislation that provided for twenty year terms.365
He concluded that such short terms would present problems for making
investments in water-related facilities if it is for some, sort of capital
intensive use. Under his scheme, variable term permits would be for the
duration of the plant or enterprise. His examples are from North and
South Carolina legislation, which provide a base of ten years but longer if
necessary to amortize the facilities.366 However, he noted that even long
term permits present an investment problem toward the end of the term if a
facility breaks down; the question is whether to spend a lot of money in
3-1See supra text accompanying

notes 293-323.

311 These

are the basic limitations on the private right that are contemplated by the Code
in
ch. 7 and correspond to the three subparts in ch. 7. RRMWC ch. 7.
3
' Tarlock, supra note 145.
361 See infra text accompanying notes 378-392.
362 Ausness, supra note 330.
363 Id. at 584-86.
586-87.
Id. at 584.
3' This he appears to view as running from forty to sixty years. Id. at 587.
364 Id. at
363
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repairs if the term is about to expire and renewal is uncertain. He also
noted that while renewal might be possible under then existing statutes,
many of the statutes failed to set out any criteria for either renewal or nonrenewal. He suggested a scheme under which the new user would pay
compensation to the old user as a possible solution. Finally he noted that
if long term or perpetual permits are issued it would be necessary to
provide for transfer of the water right.367
The Code accomplishes essentially all that Ausness advocates.
First, the Code does not contemplate a perpetual right. Instead, it
establishes a permit term with the basic concept for limiting duration being
"the economic life of any necessary investments" and for which it sets a
maximum term of twenty years.36 However, the term can be up to fifty
years when a debt is incurred that is associated with the construction of
facilities related to the use of the water by a government or other public
body or by a public service corporation.369 The Code also provides for a
renewal preference to the current holder of the permit.37 Renewals are
favored if a competing application for a new use serves the public interest
only equally to or less than the renewed use would.3 7' The prior
investment in the associated facilities is to be considered in determining
public interest.372
On the other hand, under the Code a permit may not last the full
term. It is subject to forfeiture as to all or part373 of the water right 74 under
three different circumstances; (1) the holder wastes375 water,3 76 (2) the
' 377
holder fails to withdraw or use water for "consecutive five (5) years,
Id. at 587-589. Abrams also discusses the desirability of allowing permits to be
transferred.
See Abrams, supra note 277, at 281.
36
pRRMWC § 7R-1-02(1).
367

369 id.

37 RRMWC § 6R-3-04(4). RRMWC § 7R-1-02(2) erroneously lists the preference as
being in RRMWC § 6R-3-04(3). The permit holder must apply before the permit expires
but cannot apply more than six months before expiration. RRMWC § 7R-1-02(2).
171RRMWC
372

Id.

§ 6R-3-04(4).

373 Id.§7R-1-03(3).
374

Id. § 7R-1-03.

371
Id. § 2R-2-27

defines waste.
§ 7R-1-03(l).
177 Id. Years during which water is either physically or legally unavailable do
not count.
376 RpEMWC

Id. According to the commentary this would mean that in a sequence of three years
nonuse, six years of unavailability, two years of nonuse, the five years would be met. It
would not be met if there were three years of nonuse, six years of use, two years of
nonuse.
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and (3) the agency determines that the holder will be unable to comply
with the requirements or conditions for using the water.37 Forfeiture can
be viewed as one form of modification.
B. Modification

The Code in the introductory commentary to the segment on
modification states: "[t]he Code .

.

. adopts a policy of favoring the

modification of water rights in order to promote the highest or best use of
the resource."379 To further this policy, the Code allows the permit holder
to apply for a modification "of any term or condition of the permit,
including the name of the person holding the permit,"38 but the
modification does not become effective until approved by the agency.38'
The standards by which the agency is to evaluate the modification are the
378 RRMWC § 7R-1-03(2).

RRMWC at 279. See also RRMWC § 1R-1-07, quoted supra in text accompanying
note 289. There is a current focus, particularly in the western United States, on
transferring water from one use to another, supposedly a higher or better use. See
generally Owen L. Anderson and Pauline M. Simmons, Reallocation, in 2 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 16.04 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999). While there are
proponents of a free-market or just plain market model for these efforts, e.g., TERRY L.
ANDERSON, WATER CRISIS: ENDING THE POLICY DROUGHT (1983), others simply include
market approaches as a significant element, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Markets for
Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 261, while still others fimd the market
concept not very useful at all, e.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting
379

Names Right: The Myths of Markets for Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y
REv. 317. Lynda L. Butler, Defining a Water Ethic through Comprehensive Reform: A
Suggested Frameworkfor Analysis, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 439, explained why efficiency
should not be the only consideration in water law reform. Id. at 449-458. However, she

also found three primary problems with reform efforts at achieving efficiency: (1) efforts
to prescribe efficiency were vague, id. at 451; (2) prescribing efficiency assumed the
availability of lots of data that was not likely to be available, id. at 451-52 (and if it was
available how would it be translated into a plan, id. at 452); and (3) a plan based on lack
of data would magnify the probability and consequences of wrong decisions, id. at 453.
She pointed out that where there is an existing market these defects are more important
but where there is no market these defects are much less critical, and a market has not
existed for water. Id. at 454-58. What she calls for is more flexibility, doing essentially
two things: (1) allowing transfers and (2) recognizing return flow as an asset of the water
holder. Id. at 456-57. But when there are no common law rules to govern, such as for
interbasin transfers, then a statute needs to supply them. Id. at 457. In other words, to
accomplish any approach, a prerequisite is an appropriate legal framework.
380
381

RRMWC § 7R-2-01(l).
Id. § 7R-2-01(2).
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same standards used to evaluate a permit application in the first instance.382
The Code assumes that water rights holders who would be adversely
affected by the modification have,.a protectable interest but not one
sufficient to veto the modification.3 3 If an adversely affected user refuses
to consent to the modification, the agency can still approve the
modification by conditioning the approval upon the payment of "adequate
compensation" to the, adversely affected user. 3 4 The commentary likens
this to "a private eminent domain power." 315 The' agency becomes the
"arbiter of such disputes." 386
The Code provides a streamlined method of approval for what it
labels "non-injurious modifications. 387 Where a permittee meets the
test, 388 the assignee need only file notice of the assignment Within thirty
days of the assignment. 3 9 - A failure to provide the notice results in
voiding the permit.390 Complying with the requirement results in a new
permit to the assignee, although only for the unexpired term of the
assigned permit.39 The Code gives the agency authority to create other
classes of modification, that would not require specific review and
approval.392 These modification provisions may well meet Professor
Thompson's "market for nature" prerequisites.393
C. Drought
In his 1983 review of existing regulated riparian statutes,394
Richard Ausness found that temporary water shortages provided "[a]
serious weakness in most" existing statutes as they failed to provide an

382

Id. § 7R-2-02(1).

383

Id. § 7R-2-02(3).

3" Id. § 7R-2-02(3).
35

RRMWC at 289.

386Id.
387
388

Id. § 7R-2-03.
"[D]oes not alter the place, time, or manner or [sic] use." RRMWC § 7R-2-03(l).

RRMWC § 7R-2-03(1).
390Id. § 7R-2-03(2).
389

91
Id. § 7R-2-03(3).
392

Id. § 7R-2-03(4).

"9Thompson, supra note 138.
394
Ausness, supra note 45, at 547 (reviewing

legislation in fourteen states).
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allocation scheme for periods of water shortage.395 His view was that the
advantages of a fixed plan outweighed the advantages of flexibility.39 6
Ausness reviewed three approaches toward allocation during shortages; (1)
preferential use, (2) straight rationing, and (3) temporal priority. He
concluded that including all three in the emergency allocation plan may be
the fairest approach.397 While the Code does not select the approach to be
taken during a drought, it does require the adoption of drought
management strategies39 that are to anticipate "reasonably foreseeable"
water shortages and emergencies. The Code specifies seven factors that
any drought management strategies must include. 399
The Code distinguishes between a water shortage4' and a water
emergency."' The agency must formally declare that either a shortage or
an emergency exists before the drought management strategies could
apply to the drought.f 2 However, there is a duty to declare one or the
other when specified conditions are present.40 3 A shortage arises when
"available water falls so far below normally occurring quantities that
substantial conflict among water users or injury to water resources are
If restrictions that would be imposed under a
expected to occur."'
shortage "are insufficient to protect public health, safety, and welfare," the
conditions for an emergency exist."

39

sd. at 581-84. While some statutes gave authority to react to drought, id.at 581-82,
only New Jersey and Florida required it at the time. Id. Abrams also discussed the need
for having priorities set for times of shortage. Abrams, supra note 81, at 267-68, 279.
396 Ausness, supra note 45, at 582.
397

Id. at 584.

398RRMWC

§ 4R-2-02(l).
'99Id. § 4R-2-02(2)(a)-(g). These are (1) criteria with which to identify the onset and
severity of a shortage or emergency; (2) specification of water use classes and their
priorities based on their relationship to public interest; (3) measures for auditing use and
detecting leaks; (4) measures for overall system rehabilitation; (5) a registry of
conservation measures for public and private buildings; (6) registered private agreements
to curtail uses in times of shortage or emergency; and (7) possible bans or restrictions on
certain water uses. Id. RRMWC § 4R-2-02(2)(h) authorizes "other necessary contingency
plans."
RRMWC § 7R-3-02(l).
4-1Id. § 7R-3-03(1).
402 Id. §§ 2R-2-31(2), 2R-2-29(2). In declaring either, the agency must "clearly delineate
the area of the State and the water sources included." RRMWC § 7R-3-04.
403RRMWC
404

§§ 7R-3-02(1), 7R-3-03(1).

Id.§ 2R-2-31(1).

4 Id. § 2R-2-29(1).
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When a shortage is declared to exist, the holder of a permit is
entitled to notice and a contested hearing before being restricted.4 6 In a
declared emergency, a restriction can go forward under an immediate
order,40 7 although the order does not take effect until the person to be
restricted is served with the order. " The agency can also restrict water
withdrawals that do not require a permit during either a water shortage or a
water emergency, 4" but notice and hearing requirements and opportunities
exist just as with the permittees." ° That all users should be regulated
during such a period was another aspect Ausness found was crucial to
drought management.4"
If an affected permittee requests a hearing, that hearing must
commence within ten days after the agency receives the request for the
hearing,412 with the burden of proof on the party requesting the hearing.4"3
The order remains in effect pending the result of the hearing.1 4
Any permit term or condition can be restricted as set out in the
drought management strategies 415 unless the agency finds that they are
inappropriate to the situation at hand. 416' The agency is required, however,
to comply with the preferences provided for in the Code."1 ' These
preferences are direct human consumption and sanitation necessary for
human survival and health,418 survival or health of livestock and crops,
preserving physical plants, and equipment from physical damage or loss; 419
and uses that maximize employment and economic benefits within the
sustainable development goal set forth in the comprehensive water plan.420
Within each of these preferences, the uses that maximize reasonable use of
4

§ 7R-3-02(2).
401 Id. § 7R-3-03(2).
408 Id. §
0Id.

7R-3-04. The order has to be "precise" as to date and time that the withdrawal or

use must stop or change. RRMWC § 7R-3-03(3).
' RRMWC § 7R-3-05(l). See supra note 357 & accompanying text.

410RRMWC § 7R-3-05(2).

Ausness, supra note 45, at 579.
RRMWC § 7R-3-03(5).
4 13
Id. § 7R-3-03(6).
411

412

§ 7R-3-03(7).
4" Defined in RRMWC § 2R-2-09 and developed by the state agency under RRMWC
§
4Id.

4R-2-02. See infra text accompanying notes 398-399.
416 RRMWC
417

§ 7R-3-01(1)&(2).
Id. § 7R-3-01(3).

418

Id. § 6R-3-04(l)(a).

419

id. § 6R-3-04(l)(b).
oId. § 6R-3-04(l)(c).

42
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" '
water are preferred.42
Abrams puts as his top 'preference choice
supporting concentrated populations.42 He notes that although domestic
use requires substantial withdrawals from water sources, particularly for
sewage disposal, very little of that water is consumed. His second choice
is instream flow protection, which he identifies as even less consumptive a
use than municipal needs. But he recognizes that it does not fit into the
permit system 'with the same facility as uses that have specific sponsors.
"[H]ow protection can be coordinated with the preference system is the
first order of business in ensuring that instream flow protection does not
compromise the sewage and drinking water needs of concentrated
populations."423 The Code appears to solve this problem by making
minimum flows or levels in effect the top preference, so that permits for
withdrawal of water can be issued only as long as the minimum flow or
level is maintained. 2 4 Abrams then explores the question of ascertaining
the quantity of water for which a preference permit would be issued. He
examines the experiences of use quantification under the prior
appropriation and the reserved rights systems and notes that the same
scarcity and competition issues behind those systems are the issues
important to those eastern states that are moving away from common law
riparian doctrine.4 5 Among other issues that Abrams considers are to
what extent permits should be transferable to other priority level uses and
what the priority should be within each use level. The Code does provide
that within a use preference category, uses that maximize the reasonable
use of water are to be preferred.426

V. COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING UNDER THE CODE

As noted earlier,427 the Code does not select the watershed
management approach for the state; rather, such an approach would

421

Id. § 6R-3-04(3).

Robert H.Abrams, Replacing Riparianismin the Twenty-First Century, 36 WAYNE L.
REv. 93, 100-101 (1989).
423 Id. at 102.
424 See supra text accompanying notes 170-172. The only exception is during a water
emergency when it might be possible to invade minimum flow in some limited
circumstances. See supra text accompanying notes 174-175.
422

425 Abrams,

supra note 422, at 106.

4216
RRMWC § 6R-3-04(3).
427 See supra Part I of this article.
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emerge from the comprehensive planning required by the Code.
Therefore, this section explores the Code provisions on planning.
After analyzing legislation in fourteen eastern states, Richard
Ausness 42 identified water resources planning to be a weak area.4 29 He
found planning to be fragmented among several agencies.430 To Ausness,
a comprehensive plan is essential. It would allow the public interest to be
dealt with, such as through the institution of instream flows. He also
identified a necessity for coordination between the plan and permit
issuance.43 '
The Code clearly identifies a policy in favor of comprehensive
planning.432 The planning responsibility sections deal with two elements
of planning, the comprehensive water allocation plan433 and drought
management strategies,"' and two aids to planning, a statewide data
system43 and planning advisory committees.436
The agency is to develop and adopt a comprehensive water
allocation plan437 within five years of the date the Code becomes
effective.43 The objective of the plan is to "collect data and devise
strategies for achieving sustainable development of the waters of the
State.""39 The plan is to (1) identify existing uses of waters within the
state," (2) estimate future trends in water uses in the state, including the
current and future capability of public water supply systems to provide
water for their service areas and the development choices necessary for
attaining optimum reasonable use of water,"' (3) identify boundaries of
the basins of major water sources within the state," 2 (4) estimate the safe
Ausness, supra note 45.

428

429

d. at 579-581.

430 See supra text

accompanying notes 69-102 for a discussion of the water allocation
versus water quality agency roles.
431 Ausness, supra note 45, at 579.
432 RRMWC § 1R-1-04.
433
Id. § 4R-2-01.
414Id. § 4R-2-02. The drought management strategies have already been discussed. See
supra text accompanying notes 394-426.
43RRMWC § 4R-2-03.
436
Id. § 4R-2-04.
437
Defined in RRMWC § 2R-2-04.
43RRMWC § 4R-2-01(1).
439 Id. § 4R-2-01(2).
"'Id.§ 4R-2-01(2)(a).
"1Id. § 4R-2-01(2)(b).
442 Id. § 4R-2-01(2)(c).
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yield" 3 for each major source and, where applicable, the necessary
minimum flows and levels and, recharge areas, for groundwater, ' (5)
evaluate the reasonableness. of various classes of water use," 5 (6) describe
the systems for allocating water during a water shortage or water
emergency," 6 and (7) set out the goals for the use, management, and
protection of the water of the state and related land resources and evaluate
alternative reconmendations according to economic, environmental,
hydrologic, jurisdictional, legal, social, and other relevant parameters." 7
Because of the importance of data to comprehensive planning,4 8'
the Code provides that the agency can require the registration of water
uses that are not required to have a permit under the Code, 9 and provides
for the protection of confidential business information.45
The Code also provides for planning advisory committees whose
purpose it is to assist the agency in formulating plans, programs, and
strategies.451 It is up to the agency to determine by regulation how the
committees should be constituted and function.452 The Code only provides,
that the committees may include representatives not only from various
government agencies but also from "all persons or groups interested in or
directly affected by any proposed or existing plan or strategies."4 3
Once the plan is finalized, the agency can approve a permit only if
the withdrawal and use "are consistent with" the plan and/or the drought
management strategies.454
As noted earlier,455 the watershed management ,approach
contemplates management of both land and water. Clearly the Code
focuses on the water management side. Where does the Code leave the
RRMWC § 2R-2-21 defines safe yield as the amount of water that can be withdrawn
from a water source without impairing the long-term social utility of the source including
maintaining its protected biological, chemical, and physical integrity, id., and identifies
its determination as a comparison of natural and artificial replenishment with existing
and planned consumptive and nonconsumptive uses. RRMWC § 2R-2-21(2).
RRMWC § 4R-2-01(d).

44

"4
446

Id. § 4R-2-01(e).
d. § 4R-2-01(f).

Id. § 4R-2-01(g).
,'See supra notes 81 and 196 and accompanying text.
"7

449
RRMWC § 6R-1-06.
450
Id. § 4R-1-09.
411
Id.
452

§ 4R-2-04.
Id. § 4R-2-04(l).

4I RRMWC § 4R-2-04(2).
4
1 Id. § 6R-3-01(1)(c).
411
See supra text accompanying notes 140-146.
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agency as far as land management is concerned?
While the
comprehensive water allocation plan must include "recommended goals
for the use, management, and protection of the waters of the State and
related land resources, ' the most significant points of control seem to
be in determining reasonable uses for water 5 7 and in determining the
adequacy of a conservation plan.45 However, with the coordination of
water quantity and water quality under the Code,459 the agency will have to
consider the pollution control focal point to ,consider such as nonpoint
source controls. In that context, the TMDL program, 46° for example, is
directly concerned with land use issues.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Code contains elements that are necessary for a successful
watershed management approach to the water resource. It provides for
applying the same rules to all naturally occurring waters, coordinating
water allocation and water pollution control, integrating environmental
and ecological concerns and values with efficiency and social values, and
delineating the scope and susceptibility to regulation of private rights in
water. However, the Code does not opt for the watershed management
approach; instead that choice would be delineated in the comprehensive
water allocation plan.
This article identifies four interrelated themes underlying the Code
that support management of the water resource within the context of both
human consumptive use and environmental and ecological perspectives.
These four themes are (1) public ownership and interest, (2) sustainable
development, (3) conservation, and (4) comprehensive water allocation
planning, all with a view to getting maximum utilization out of the water
resource. Public ownership of, and interest in, the water resource is
declared paramount. However, public interest will be reflected largely
through the concept of sustainable development,461 a necessary element of

4

6

RRMWC § 4R-2-01(g) (emphasis added).

457See

supra text accompanying notes 305-318.
accompanying notes 200-207.
459
See supra text accompanying notes 69-102.
411See supra text
40

See Robert E. Beck & C. Peter Goplerud, The Water Quality Approach, in 5 WATERS

§ 54.02(b)(1) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1998 & Supp. 1999).
The comment to RRMWC § 1R-1-01 states "in major part." Id. at 2. The comment to
RRMWC § 2R-2-18 states "will center on." Id. at 50.
AND WATER RIGHTS
46'
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which is water resource conservation, with comprehensive planning as the
principal tool used to delineate how to achieve sustainable development.46
While the Code contains important prerequisites that relate directly
to water management, it does not contain as significant a focus on the
other aspect of watershed management, regulation of water-related land
resources, although, as previously pointed out,463 there are several
important land-related aspects to the Code. Perhaps the best observation
to this aspect is the observation made in the ecosystem study,4" that while
freshwater and terrestrial biodiversity should be conserved together
because of their interconnection, the manager has to use the best tools that
are available for managing each one.465
Furthermore, the Code almost totally meets the criticisms466 that
have been leveled against common law riparian doctrine and existing
regulated riparianism statutes by thoughtful critics. Abram's concern with
the uncertainty of the scope of the common law riparian right, the failure
of the common law to deal with environmental and ecological issues, and
that regulated riparianism statutes may be rigid, fail to articulate policy
objectives, and tend to overregulate, are all addressed in the Code. It
provides set term water permits and for their transfer,467 develops extensive
policy objectives, including environmental and ecological objectives,468
and includes an option for use of local or regional water management
districts.469 Ausness's concern about regulated riparianism statutes failing
to provide for (1) water resource planning, (2) integration of groundwater
and surface water, (3) drought management, (4) reallocation and transfer,
and (5) regulation of all categories of use, are similarly dealt with in the
Code. It requires both a water allocation plan and the development of
RRMWC § 1R-l-04 comes the closest in the Code to articulating this interrelationship
in one thought.
'6' See supra text accompanying notes 455-460.
' See supra text accompanying notes 142-144.
465
ABELL, supra note 142, at 3.
466 Because of the focus on watershed management in this symposium, several aspects of
the Code are not developed in this article. For example, municipal use of water and
storage of water are important in Abram's writings. As pointed out, supra text
accompanying note 422, he makes municipal use the number one priority for his
462

proposed approach to water resource management. Storage, he observes, is intimately
related
to municipal use. Abrams, supra note 422, at 103.
467
RRMWC §7R-l-01; RRMWC 7R-1-02.
" See, e.g., supra notes 147-181 and accompanying text.
469 RRMWC at 128-154.
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drought management strategies."'
It integrates surface water with
"'
groundwater and provides for reallocation and transfer of water permits.47
Although the Code would establish a quantity limit on the permit
requirement,472 it otherwise regulates all categories of withdrawers of
water and consumptive users.473 Butler's primary concern with failure to
address environmental and ecological concerns and with the lack of
fairness to both future users and existing users are to a large extent also
dealt with in the Code. The protection accorded minimum flow goes a
long way, while the provision for compensation in a number of instances
and the sustainable development approach both speak to fairness elements.
Of course the critics are not in full agreement on their criticisms,
and the Code often contains a compromise; for example, between Abrams'
uncertainty about how to make instream flow a high level of preference in
an allocation scheme and Butler's concept of the public interest being
translated into property. The Code meets the market aspects of Abram's
and Butler's criticisms only by making the permit transferable and subject
to involuntary modification by the payment of compensation, but not by
focusing any further on developing a market474 or by making return flow a
part of the water right.
Because the Code would change common law riparian doctrine and
even statutory provisions in existing regulated riparianism statutes, the
potential for successful constitutional challenges needs to be considered.475
Any new Water use rights created under the Code will come subject to the
conditions provided for in the Code and thus without any significant
constitutional issues. 76 However, under the Code there are six possible
impacts on existing water rights that need to be noted and considered for
any constitutional complications that they might raise. Most do not appear
470 Id.

at 109-12, 294-3 10.
RRMWC § 2R-2-32; RRMWC § 6R-3-06.
RRMWC § 6R-3-01.
473 RRMWC § 2R-2-06; RRMWC § 2R-2-13; RRMWC § 2R-2-34.
474
See Abrams's second goal to "lend guidance to the administrative bodies charged with
permitting water uses and encourage them to go forward and, where possible, incorporate
additional strategies that reflect market values and thereby insure efficient resource
utilization." Abrams, supra note 81, at 284.
471 Commentary in the Code does discuss constitutional issues in several instances.
See,
e.g., RRMWC at 213-14, 311-16.
476 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992) (holding that
when limitations on property existed when the owner took title to the property, the
government may apply those limitations to the property without providing
compensation).
411
472
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to raise serious concerns. However, only the most obvious responses are
noted in each instance below.
First, the Code limits the riparian usufructuary right to withdraw or
consume water to a term, although the opportunity for renewal exists. "
This resembles zoning law where the city or town deals with
nonconforming uses and puts limitations on their continuance.478 Second,
the Code adds nonriparians to the group of potential water users by
eliminating the riparian land requirement (and the overlying land
requirement as to groundwater) thereby diluting the opportunities for
water use by riparian (or overlying) owners. However, -in many states this
has already been accomplished through evolution in the common law.479

Third, under the Code's allocation scheme existing riparians may not be
able to obtain water for a future consumptive use when they want it.
However, most courts have viewed claims to a right to make a use of
water at some time in the future to be inchoate and not vested.48 Fourth,
even some existing riparian water users may have their use restricted in the
process of converting from an existing system to the Code. This may be
the strongest case for compensation, particularly if the result occurs
because of the imposition of a minimum flow or level requirement and
would not occur otherwise. However, it is important to keep in mind that
minimum flow prescription is necessary only because the state has
undertaken to alter the common law scheme which was protecting the
17

RRMWC § 7R-1-02.

478 j. JUERGENSMEYER AND T. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW §§

4.31-4.40 (1998).
479 All riparian jurisdictions have always recognized as the outer limit of
the riparian
property the watershed boundary. The Code maintains that outer limit, albeit in a
different format, by providing protection for the basin from out-of-basin transfers.
Clearly had all land in the basin been in single ownership, the single owner would have
had a riparian right for the entire acreage. Thus the only aspect being affected by the
Code is the artificial, arbitrary boundary line created by the division of the riparian land
into tracts that abut and tracts that do not abut on the water source. Furthermore, all land
within the basin contributes runoff to the water source. Thus there is nothing inequitable
in saying that all land in the basin can benefit from the water once it reaches the body in

question. Indeed a strong argument can be made that equity demands sharing of the
water throughout the basin. Finally, it is not clear from a historical perspective whether

the aspect of the riparian definition limiting the water right to contiguous ownership had
to do with anything other than the issue of access. The Code specifically provides that
the abolition of the rule does not give a right of access to the body of water across private
property. RRMWC § 2R-1-02(2).
480 See, e.g, Loosle v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Logan, 858 P.2d 999, 1002
(Utah 1993).
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public interest through its inefficiency. Fifth, the Code imposes a
conservation duty.48 ' However, requiring common owners to conserve
their common resource was validated by the courts a long time ago in the
oil and gas field. 42 Finally, the Code allocates cutbacks during periods of
drought. 4 a However, credits are provided for meeting conservation plans
and the drought management strategies will have been adopted in advance
of the crisis.
Whether the possible impacts have constitutional implications
should be considered fully. In addition, fairness, as discussed by Butler,
may call for compensation even if the Constitution does not require it.
The Code does provide for some forms of compensation in connection
with involuntary modification of a water permit, when undertaking
conservation of water that has not previously been wasted, and in
transferring water from one basin to another.
Hopefully the discussion in this article will stimulate others to
review the Code and still others to make use of it. Clearly the Code
should be in the hands of anyone and everyone who has anything to do
with developing or implementing water resource legislation, even if their
involvement is limited to only one isolated instance. The Code should be
looked to for concepts, suggested language and important legal analysis.
For example, if a state wants to consider integrating water quantity
allocation and water quality control, the Code has a suggested way of
doing it, thus avoiding the necessity of reinventing the wheel. The end
product is summarized in the editor notes in the preface to the Code:
"Probably each person who contributed to this project
could pick at least a few points where he or she thinks the
end products could be improved-the end products are not
any single person's efforts, interests, or conclusions. Those
involved in the project agree that overall the end products
are carefully balanced to represent a coherent body of law
that would markedly improve the law of water allocation as
presently found in many States. 48 4

481
42

RRMWC § 6R-3-01(1)(d)

See, e.g., Hartnan v. State Corp. Comm'n, 529 P.2d 134, 143 (Kansas 1974).
411 RRMWC § 7R-3-01; RRMWC § 7R-3-05.
484 Id. at ii.
1
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The first sentence is likely true. The second sentence is clearly true and
focuses, therefore, on the most important contribution of the Code. I
would think it an important contribution even for a state that has a preexisting regulated riparianism statute. The quote speaks directly to the
third major goal that Abrams posited for changing then existing
riparianism: to "achieve an overall coherence that fulfills the public's
expectation of rational, purposeful water allocation."4 5

45 Abrams, supra note 474, at 284.

